Caddoux & Anor v Bow Street Magistrates' Court

Previous conviction prevents extradition only where the subsequent accusation is the same offence in fact and law. It does not apply merely because conduct relied on as evidence of one conspiracy also formed part of another conspiracy. The core of conspiracy is the agreement alleged, and different agreements constitute different offences.

The court’s jurisdiction to prevent return as an abuse of process is limited. Under section 11(3) of the Extradition Act 1989, delay or bad faith must make return unjust or oppressive. The court is not generally entitled to examine whether foreign proceedings should have been brought earlier or whether they are otherwise abusive.

The applicant had pleaded guilty in England to a conspiracy involving the importation of cocaine and cannabis into England and had been sentenced. France later sought his extradition for three offences concerning an alleged conspiracy to evade import restrictions and possess cannabis in France.

A District Judge committed him to await the Secretary of State’s decision, rejecting pleas based on previous conviction and abuse of process. The applicant sought habeas corpus and renewed permission to apply for judicial review. The central issues were whether section 6(3) of the Extradition Act 1989 applied and whether return would be unjust or oppressive under section 11(3).

1. Applications dismissed. The applicant established no ground for habeas corpus. The renewed application for permission to seek judicial review was hopeless and was dismissed.
2. Section 6(3) of the Extradition Act 1989 requires consideration of whether, if charged in the United Kingdom with the extradition offence, the applicant would be entitled to discharge under the law relating to previous acquittal or conviction.
3. The plea of autrefois convict did not apply. The English indictment alleged a long-running conspiracy with others to evade prohibitions on importing cocaine and cannabis into England. The first French charge alleged a different conspiracy, involving different participants and a different agreement, directed to importation into France. The fact that the same movement of drugs might be evidence of both conspiracies did not make the offences the same in fact and law. The principle stated in Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 and applied in R v Beedie [1998] QB 356 supported that conclusion.
4. Section 11(3) did not require discharge. The extradition request was made in circumstances where earlier proceedings could not appropriately have resulted in return while the applicant was serving his sentence. Viewing the history as a whole, there was no delay making return unjust or oppressive, and no evidence that the request was not made in good faith in the interests of justice.
5. The court was not entrusted with a general abuse-of-process jurisdiction in these extradition proceedings. Re Schmidt [1995] AC 339 was relied on for that limitation. Kashamu (No 2) [2002] QB 887 recognised only a limited jurisdiction concerning the lawfulness, Convention compliance and arbitrariness of detention, which did not arise here.
6. The court also noted, by reference to R v Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Soblen [1963] 2 QB 243, that deportation and extradition could raise distinct questions, but accepted that comity justified allowing the extradition proceedings to proceed before deportation.

1. Bow Street Magistrates' Court: On 12 November 2003 the District Judge committed the applicant to await the Secretary of State’s decision on the French extradition request and rejected the previous-conviction and abuse-of-process arguments.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): The application for habeas corpus and the renewed application for permission to seek judicial review were dismissed.