HM Attorney General v Fradkina

Under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the High Court may make a civil proceedings order where a person has habitually and persistently, and without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious civil proceedings or made vexatious applications. The court must be satisfied that the statutory conditions are met and must then consider whether the order is appropriate. A pattern of repeated attempts to re-litigate matters already determined, coupled with repeated unmeritorious proceedings and non-compliance with court orders, may justify an order restraining both the commencement and continuation of civil proceedings without leave.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for a civil proceedings order against the defendant. Since arriving in the United Kingdom, she had brought numerous claims, appeals and applications, principally concerning housing, criminal proceedings and care proceedings concerning her son. Many proceedings had been struck out or dismissed, and she had repeatedly sought to re-litigate matters already determined. The central issues were whether the statutory conditions were satisfied and whether a civil proceedings order should be made.

The Divisional Court granted the Attorney General’s application and made a civil proceedings order.

1. Section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 permits the High Court, after hearing the person concerned or giving an opportunity to be heard, to make a civil proceedings order where the person has habitually and persistently, and without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious civil proceedings or made vexatious applications in civil proceedings.
2. The court assessed the defendant’s litigation history as demonstrating repeated attempts to re-litigate matters already determined. Examples included multiple claims concerning the same accommodation, repeated challenges to a conviction, and further proceedings and applications concerning concluded care proceedings.
3. The court also took into account the defendant’s automatic resort to appeals, her unwillingness to give effect to court orders, breach of an order made under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989, and unpaid costs orders. Although a small number of matters had been settled, allowed by consent or otherwise had some procedural explanation, the overall pattern remained habitually and persistently vexatious and without reasonable ground.
4. Lord Justice Kennedy was satisfied both that the statutory conditions were met and that it was appropriate to make the order. The order prohibited the institution of civil proceedings in any court without leave of the High Court, prohibited continuation of existing civil proceedings without such leave, and required leave for applications in civil proceedings, subject to the statutory application for leave. Mr Justice Mackay agreed.