Case details
Summary
The transitional provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 preserved the restriction on pre-commencement assignments of reversionary copyright interests. They did not, however, prevent a living author from assigning that interest after the Act came into force. The unrestricted power of assignment in section 36 applied unless the transitional provisions expressly qualified it. A later assignment of the whole copyright, expressly made to operate under the 1956 Act, therefore included the reversionary interest where its ordinary commercial meaning required that result.
Factual background
The claimant claimed the reversionary copyright interest in musical works composed by Richard Addinsell before 1 June 1957. Addinsell had assigned the copyright in the 1940s and executed a further assignment to the defendant in 1973. The claimant relied on a 2000 assignment from Addinsell’s trustees.
The central questions were whether the transitional provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 preserved the statutory restriction on assignment of the reversionary interest for assignments made after commencement, and whether the 1973 assignment was, on its proper construction, wide enough to transfer that interest.
Held
- The claim was dismissed. The 1973 assignment was effective to transfer the reversionary interest to the defendant. A declaration to that effect would be made if required.
- The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 preserved the legal effect of the 1973 assignment through Schedule 1, paragraph 25. The issue therefore depended on the law under the Copyright Act 1956 at the time of the assignment.
- Schedule 1, paragraph 27 of the 1988 Act preserved the restriction imposed by the 1911 Act on assignments made before 1 June 1957. It did not determine the effect of assignments made between that date and the commencement of the 1988 Act.
- Schedule 7, paragraph 28(1) of the 1956 Act preserved the legal effect of pre-commencement assignments. Paragraph 28(3), read with paragraph 28(1), applied the proviso to section 5(2) of the 1911 Act to such assignments. It did not qualify the prospective power of assignment conferred by section 36(1) of the 1956 Act.
- The statutory language did not expressly extend the old restriction to future assignments of copyright in existing works. The continuing vesting of the reversionary interest in the author’s estate where no later assignment was made was consistent with this construction.
- The 1973 document assigned the whole copyright in the relevant works and stated that it was to operate under the 1956 Act. Given the absence of a special context requiring a narrower meaning, its ordinary commercial meaning included the reversionary interest.
The court expressed no view on whether the assignment conveyed rights beyond copyright in the musical works, such as film rights, because that issue did not arise.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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