National Care Standards Commission, R (on the application of) v Jones

Under regulation 9 of the Care Homes Regulations 2001, fitness to manage a care home is defined by mandatory statutory requirements, not by general guidance. A tribunal must address each relevant requirement, including integrity and good character and the qualifications, skills and experience necessary for the particular home. An applicant need not demonstrate perfection: past dishonesty, criminal offending or professional misconduct may not prevent a present finding of integrity and good character. However, a tribunal must explain that conclusion carefully. On a statutory appeal, the High Court determines whether the tribunal directed itself correctly and gave intelligible reasons; the merits remain for the tribunal.

The National Care Standards Commission refused to register Jones as manager of a residential care home under Part II of the Care Standards Act 2000. The Care Standards Tribunal allowed his appeal, despite findings of professional misconduct, dishonest non-disclosure and deficiencies identified at a fit-person interview. The Commission appealed on the grounds that the Tribunal had misunderstood the statutory meaning of fitness and had reached perverse conclusions. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had applied regulation 9 correctly, whether it had adequately addressed integrity and good character and the required qualifications, skills and experience, and where the burden of proof lay on appeal.

1. Appeal allowed. The Tribunal’s decision was quashed, with liberty to apply for further directions. The merits were to be considered by another tribunal.
2. Regulation 9 of the Care Homes Regulations 2001 supplies a statutory definition of fitness for Part II of the Care Standards Act 2000. Its requirements are mandatory. They must not be treated as merely advisory guidance.
3. The Tribunal had to decide whether Jones was of integrity and good character, having regard to his dishonest answers and the Nursing and Midwifery Council’s findings of misconduct. It also had to decide whether, having regard to the particular home and its residents, he had the necessary qualifications, skills and experience. Physical and mental fitness was not in issue.
4. The statutory test does not require perfection. A person with past dishonesty, a conviction or professional misconduct may nevertheless be of present integrity and good character. But a tribunal reaching that conclusion must give careful and intelligible reasons. General evidence of successful management, commitment and improvement cannot replace an answer to the statutory question.
5. The Tribunal’s reasoning was inadequate. It treated the statutory criteria as questions about whether integrity had been merely impugned, failed properly to consider the misconduct findings in relation to integrity and good character, and concluded that the balance favoured Jones without explaining how the statutory requirements were met.
6. The High Court’s role on this statutory appeal was confined to points of law. Once correctly directed, the Tribunal remained the judge of the merits, subject to challenge only if its conclusions were perverse.
7. The judge expressed, without deciding, doubt about whether the burden on appeal lay on the Commission to prove unfitness or on the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that he was fit. That issue was reserved and played no part in the decision.

• Care Standards Tribunal: On 2 January 2004, allowed Jones’s appeal against refusal of registration.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Quashed the Tribunal’s decision because of legal misdirection and inadequate reasoning. The merits were left for reconsideration by another tribunal.