Deman, R (on the application of) v Lord Chancellor's Department & Ors

A university visitor’s decision is generally not reviewable merely for error of law. Judicial review is confined to cases where the visitor acted outside jurisdiction in the narrow sense, abused the visitor’s powers, or breached natural justice. The visitor may consider only matters falling within the jurisdiction of the university body whose decision is challenged. A visitor may also refuse to entertain a petition where an alternative statutory remedy was available, even if that remedy was not identical. Minor factual inaccuracies do not justify intervention unless they go fundamentally to jurisdiction or amount to an abuse of power.

The claimant challenged the Lord Chancellor’s decision, made as visitor of Bradford University, concerning the handling of his complaint about the refusal to award him a PhD. The university’s procedures had limited the matters capable of consideration by its Grievance Committee to a complaint of prejudice or bias. The claimant contended that the visitor had failed to consider wider complaints, made factual errors, and should have addressed allegations of racial discrimination.

The issue was whether the visitor’s decision was amenable to judicial review on those grounds and whether the existence of an alternative statutory remedy was relevant.

1. The application for permission for judicial review was rejected. The court applied the restricted approach to reviewing a university visitor stated in R v Hull University Visitor, ex parte Page [1993] AC 682. Review would not ordinarily lie for error of law. It could arise only where the visitor acted outside jurisdiction in the narrow sense, abused the visitor’s powers, or breached natural justice.
2. The alleged factual inaccuracies, including errors concerning the history of the complaints and Professor Alderson’s gender, did not fundamentally affect jurisdiction and did not constitute an abuse of power.
3. The university committee had power to determine only matters referred to it after the Pro-Vice-Chancellor found a prima facie case. Since the other complaints had not been referred, the committee had no power to determine them. The visitor was therefore entitled, and effectively required, to confine his review to the committee’s decision and the matters properly before it.
4. The claimant’s allegations concerning institutional racism and wider complaints had not been advanced as separate grounds before the visitor. The presence of racial-discrimination allegations did not alter the applicable limits of the visitor’s jurisdiction.
5. The visitor had an additional proper basis for refusing the petition because an alternative remedy before the ordinary courts was available in relation to racial discrimination. It was irrelevant for this purpose that the earlier proceedings had been struck out without determination of their merits.
6. The defendants were awarded the costs of the acknowledgment of service, assessed at £1,000, payable within 14 days. No further permission-stage costs were ordered.