Denny, R (on the application of) v Acton Youth Court & Anor

A youth court must not remit an offender to an adult magistrates’ court for sentence where the offence is triable only on indictment for an adult. Such a remittal is legally defective because the receiving court has no sentencing jurisdiction. The remittal may be quashed, leaving the matter in the youth court.

A remittal under section 9 is an order made when dealing with an offender and may therefore be rescinded under section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, provided the youth court has not been overtaken by substantive proceedings in the adult court.

The claimant, aged 17 when charged with attempted robbery, was convicted in the Acton Youth Court after substantial delay. Having attained 18, he was remitted to Ealing Magistrates’ Court for sentence under section 9 of the Powers of the Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000.

The adult court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because attempted robbery was triable only on indictment for an adult. It adjourned the matter and invited the youth court to reconsider the remittal. The claimant sought judicial review, principally arguing that the youth court could not rescind its order under section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. The issues were whether the remittal was lawful and whether it could be rescinded.

1. The application for judicial review was refused in the form sought, but the remittal order was quashed. The claimant was directed to attend the youth court for sentence as soon as possible.

2. Section 9(1) of the Powers of the Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000 does not expressly exclude indictable-only offences. Nevertheless, section 9(2)(b) requires the receiving court to deal with the case only in a way in which it would have had power to deal with it had the earlier proceedings occurred there. It therefore makes no legal sense to remit an offender to an adult magistrates’ court for sentence where that court has no power to sentence for the offence.

3. The defect was primarily one of illegality, though it also involved unreasonableness. It required the remittal to be quashed, with the case remaining in the youth court where it began. The public interest in sentencing a person convicted of a serious offence was not displaced by the delay; the sentencing court could take the delay into account.

4. A remittal under section 9 is an order made when dealing with an offender, not merely a preparatory or procedural step. Section 142(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 therefore empowered the youth court to rescind it and replace an invalid order. That power would cease once the case had been overtaken by substantive proceedings in the adult court, but that point had not been reached because the adult court had only arranged and heard jurisdictional argument, adjourned the matter and granted bail.

5. Youth courts were advised never to use section 9 for an offence triable only on indictment in the case of an adult. Unless the offence warrants committal to the Crown Court for trial, the proceedings must be completed in the youth court. Parliament might wish to address the apparent statutory lacuna.

The judgment does not state an appellate history. It records a judicial review application following the claimant’s conviction and remittal by the Acton Youth Court.