Andrews v Reading Borough Council

A claim based on increased traffic noise may engage Article 8 where the interference with private and family life is sufficiently serious. At the summary-judgment stage, the court must assume that the claimant can prove the pleaded facts and ask whether the claim has a real prospect of success. In assessing justification under Article 8(2), the decision-maker must strike a fair balance between individual and community interests. The availability, or absence, of measures to mitigate noise is a relevant factor. A public authority retains a margin of judgment, but statutory schemes do not necessarily exclude a remedy required to secure Convention rights. A claim cannot be prevented solely because its financial value makes litigation disproportionate. Security for costs is exceptional, and apparent weakness alone will rarely suffice.

The claimant sought damages under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 for the cost of installing noise insulation at his home. He alleged that a traffic regulation order made under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 had materially increased traffic noise and interfered with his Article 8 rights.

The claim began in the County Court. An application to strike it out was dismissed, and the proceedings were later transferred to the High Court after an application for summary judgment. The central issues were whether the claim had a real prospect of establishing an Article 8 interference, whether the interference was plainly justified under Article 8(2), and whether security for costs should be ordered.

1. Forum and procedure. The transfer to the Administrative Court was inappropriate. The observations in Anufrijeva v London Borough of Southwark [2004] 1 All E.R. 833 concerned claims involving maladministration and did not require an ordinary private-law claim, which did not depend on establishing maladministration, to be brought there. The jurisdiction provisions also prevented this claim, valued below the relevant threshold, from being brought in the High Court.
2. Article 8 interference. Noise caused by a public authority’s scheme can interfere with private and family life. Increased traffic noise may engage Article 8 where it seriously affects an individual. Whether the threshold is crossed is fact-sensitive and depends on the claimant’s evidence together with objective noise measurements. On the assumed facts, the claimant had a real prospect of establishing an interference.
3. Justification. Article 8(2) requires a fair balance between individual and community interests. The defendants were entitled to a generous measure of discretionary judgment, and measures approved by Parliament required proper weight. However, following Hatton v United Kingdom (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 611, the availability of measures mitigating noise was relevant. The absence of any possibility of a grant, or of consideration whether a grant should be available, could undermine justification. The court could not conclude that the claim had no real prospect of success.
4. Distinction from Marcic. Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2003] 3 W.L.R. 1603 was distinguishable because the statutory regulatory scheme in that case differed materially, whereas this claim concerned the absence of any possibility of mitigation or compensation.
5. Outcome. The application for summary judgment was dismissed. The application for security for costs was also refused. Such an order was exceptional, and the apparent weakness of the claim, even if established, would rarely suffice by itself. Directions were to be considered, with the judge indicating that the claim should probably return to the County Court.

The judgment itself does not state an appellate history. The proceedings originated in the Reading County Court and were transferred to the High Court for determination of the defendants’ applications.