Hill v Clacton Family Trust Ltd.

Whether a claimant has a mental impairment under section 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 is a question for the Employment Tribunal on the whole evidence. Medical evidence is necessary where the alleged impairment is a clinically recognised mental illness, but expert opinion does not determine the issue. The Tribunal may examine the factual basis of a claimed condition, including whether the alleged traumatic event occurred, where that is logically relevant to diagnosis. A separate social-security decision is not conclusive. It may be persuasive, but its weight depends on the evidence, the statutory test and the relevant date.

Caroline Hill was employed as a care assistant by Clacton Family Trust Ltd. She was summarily dismissed on 20 February 2001 after attending work affected by an ecstasy overdose. The Employment Tribunal found the dismissal unfair but held that she was not disabled within section 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 at the date of dismissal. It rejected her case that she had post-traumatic stress disorder arising from witnessing a fatal stunt accident, and did not proceed to determine disability discrimination.

Following review and an appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the finding was upheld. The Court of Appeal considered whether the Employment Tribunal had asked the correct question, properly assessed the medical and factual evidence, and was bound by a Social Security Appeal Tribunal decision awarding disability living allowance.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Employment Tribunal’s finding that Hill was not suffering from a qualifying mental impairment at the date of dismissal was a finding of fact. The Court of Appeal could intervene only for an error of law, including a failure to consider relevant matters, consideration of irrelevant matters, or a perverse conclusion unsupported by the evidence.
2. Medical evidence was required to establish a clinically recognised mental illness. It had to be assessed with the totality of the evidence, but the ultimate decision belonged to the Tribunal rather than to any expert. The Court applied the approach stated in McNicol v Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance Ltd [2002] IRLR 711.
3. The Tribunal was entitled to investigate whether Hill had witnessed the accident. For post-traumatic stress disorder, the alleged trauma was logically relevant to whether the condition existed and to whether the reported symptoms had another explanation. The Tribunal’s factual findings undermined the therapist’s opinion and were supported by the psychiatric evidence.
4. The Tribunal had not ignored the evidence of depression. The report supporting Hill’s case was based on medical records rather than examination. The treating psychiatrists’ evidence that she was distressed or had low mood, but was not suffering from a recognised mental illness, gave the Tribunal a proper basis for its conclusion.
5. The Social Security Appeal Tribunal’s decision was not conclusive. The proceedings were non-adversarial, the relevant date differed, and the social-security scheme applied a different statutory concept. The Employment Tribunal was required to reach its own conclusion and was not legally bound by the SSAT decision.
6. The refusal to require production of the unknown coroner’s report and possible video recording disclosed no error of law. Order: appeal dismissed with costs summarily assessed at £8,638.22, subject to detailed assessment of the applicant’s public funding certificate.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed. The Court upheld the Employment Tribunal’s finding that Hill was not disabled at the material date.
2. Employment Appeal Tribunal: upheld the Employment Tribunal’s decision as unimpeachable and rejected the appeal concerning disability.
3. Employment Tribunal: found the dismissal unfair but held that Hill was not disabled within section 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 at the date of dismissal.