Merseyside Fire and Civil Defence Authority v Bassie

Under Regulation 12(3) of the Workplace (Health, Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992, the presence of a substance which may cause slipping is sufficient to engage the employer’s obligation. Knowledge or foreseeability is not required at that stage. The employer must prove that keeping the floor free from the substance was not reasonably practicable. Reasonable practicability is assessed prospectively, by balancing the known risk against the effort and expense of eliminating or reducing it. On the facts, damp mopping after sweeping was reasonably practicable. The authority therefore breached Regulation 12(3).

The claimant suffered a serious knee injury when he slipped during fitness training in an appliance room at a fire station. The trial judge, HHJ Platts, awarded £100,000 damages, agreed subject to liability, and found the fire authority liable for breach of Regulations 5(1) and 12(3) of the Workplace (Health, Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992 and at common law.

The authority appealed the findings on causation and liability. The finding that the claimant had slipped was not challenged. The central issues were whether fine dust caused the slip and whether the floor had been kept free from a substance which might cause slipping so far as reasonably practicable.

Lord Justice Tuckey delivered the leading judgment. Lord Justices Neuberger and Waller agreed.

1. Causation. The trial judge was entitled to find that the claimant slipped on a fine film of dust. The evidence showed that the floor was safe when uncontaminated, that dust was present, and that the dust was slippery when tested by hand. The finding was open on the evidence and was not one with which the appellate court could or should interfere.
2. Regulation 12(3). Dust was a substance which might cause a person to slip. The obligation was engaged by its mere presence. Knowledge or foreseeability was not required at that stage. The obligation remained subject to the reasonably practicable defence, which the employer had to prove.
3. Reasonable practicability. The defence had to be assessed at the time before the accident, without hindsight. The relevant exercise was to balance the known risk against the effort and expense of eliminating or reducing it. The authority knew that dust and dirt would enter the appliance room, that it was thoroughly cleaned only weekly, and that its own risk assessment required a high standard of cleanliness before fitness training. Damp mopping after sweeping could have been carried out at no or no real expense. It was therefore reasonably practicable to keep the floor free from dust.
4. The finding of breach of Regulation 12(3) was sufficient to dispose of the appeal. It was unnecessary to determine the effect of Regulation 5(1) or the alternative common-law duty of care issue, which was academic.

Order: appeal dismissed with costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed the fire authority’s appeal with costs.
• Liverpool County Court: HHJ Platts awarded £100,000 damages, agreed subject to liability, and found the authority liable under Regulations 5(1) and 12(3) of the Workplace (Health, Safety & Welfare) Regulations 1992 and at common law.