Copping v Surrey County Council

Under Part V of the Housing Act 1985, service of a notice claiming the right to buy initiates a statutory procedure. It does not, without more, create an indefeasible right to acquire the property. The right must be established under the statutory scheme before the landlord’s duty to convey arises. Where the right is established in proceedings founded solely on a later notice, the relevant time for valuation and price calculation is the date of that notice. An earlier notice, denied by the landlord and not pursued, cannot determine the valuation date for the later procedure. The statutory scheme expects prompt action, although the court did not finally determine abandonment, waiver or estoppel. A different result under leasehold enfranchisement legislation turned on materially different statutory wording.

The appellants were secure tenants of a dwelling house which they sought to purchase under Part V of the Housing Act 1985. They had served a first notice claiming the right to buy on 21 March 1991 and a second notice on 30 June 2001. The respondent denied the right on the basis that occupation was required for the better performance of employment duties.

HHJ Sleeman declared that the appellants were entitled to acquire the freehold. HHJ Cook held that the relevant valuation date was 21 March 1991. Nelson J allowed the respondent’s appeal and held that the relevant time was 2 July 2001: [2005] EWHC 204(QB). The issue before the Court of Appeal was which notice governed the valuation date.

Appeal dismissed. Latham LJ delivered the judgment, with Carnwath and Mummery LJJ agreeing.

1. The right to buy under section 118 of the Housing Act 1985 is expressly subject to the conditions, exceptions and procedures in Part V. Section 138 requires the right to have been established before the landlord’s duty to convey arises. Compliance with sections 122 onwards is therefore necessary. The right may be established by the landlord’s admission or through proceedings under section 181.
2. In this case the right was established in proceedings under section 181 which were based solely on the appellants’ later section 122 notice. The statutory procedure therefore flowed from that notice. Since section 122(2) defines the relevant time as the date on which the notice is served, and sections 125 and 126 link the price to value at that time, the later notice governed the valuation date. The earlier notice did not determine the price.
3. The court rejected the submission that the absence of written withdrawal kept the first notice effective indefinitely. Section 122(3) enables a tenant to end the procedure by written withdrawal, while section 125E(4) enables a landlord to treat a claim as withdrawn where the tenant fails to take the required steps. These provisions do not preserve a denied and unpursued claim indefinitely.
4. The statutory scheme contains strict time limits and is designed for prompt progress. The court expressed doubt that a notice denied in 1991 could have been resurrected after more than 12 years, but it was unnecessary to determine abandonment, waiver or estoppel because the later proceedings themselves resolved the issue.
5. Collin v Duke of Westminster and Others, [1985] 1 QB 581, was distinguishable. Section 8(1) of the Leasehold Reform Act 1987 made the notice itself the source of the right to the grant, whereas the statutory scheme in the present case required the right to be established.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Dismissed the appellants’ second appeal and upheld the conclusion that the later notice governed the relevant valuation time.
• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) — Nelson J allowed the respondent’s appeal from HHJ Cook and held that the relevant time was 2 July 2001: [2005] EWHC 204(QB).
• Epsom County Court — HHJ Cook held that the relevant date was 21 March 1991.
• Guildford County Court — HHJ Sleeman declared that the appellants were entitled to acquire the freehold. That decision was not appealed.