Sekou SM Sackor v Secretary of State for the Home Department

On an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal limited to a point of law, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to reconsider the factual merits or receive materially new evidence unless it first identifies an error of law in the adjudicator’s decision. A challenge that a finding is perverse must show that the alleged error is apparent on the material before the adjudicator. A general reference to country evidence that an airport remained under government control, particularly where peacekeepers assisted the government, did not establish an obvious special risk on return or an error of law.

The appellant, a Liberian national, claimed asylum after alleging past detention and ill-treatment and political activity. The adjudicator accepted his evidence as broadly credible but found, in light of the August 2003 peace agreement and changed conditions in Liberia, that there was no real risk of persecution on return.

The Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed his appeal. It considered updated country material and refused to admit a later letter from the appellant’s brother, who had obtained asylum in the United States. The appellant argued that the adjudicator had erred in failing to address the risk at the airport and that the Tribunal had acted irrationally in refusing the new evidence. The central issue became whether any error of law in the adjudicator’s decision had first been established.

1. Appeal dismissed. The essential starting point was to identify an error of law in the adjudicator’s decision. Under section 101, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal could not decide the merits afresh unless it first concluded that the adjudicator’s decision was legally unsustainable because of such an error. The Court applied the approach stated by Laws LJ in CA v Secretary of State [2004] EWCA Civ 1165.
2. The appellant’s airport argument did not meet that threshold. The adjudicator’s decision did not show that the point had been advanced in the terms relied on. In any event, the country material stated that the airport was controlled by the Government while working with peacekeepers. That qualification indicated a change from the former government’s total control and did not provide an adequate basis for finding a special risk to the appellant at the airport.
3. The alleged perversity was not apparent on the face of the material. The adjudicator was not fairly open to criticism for failing to give weight to a risk which had not been specifically drawn to his attention and which was not obvious from the document.
4. Because the initial error-of-law hurdle was not crossed, it was unnecessary to decide the more difficult questions concerning the Tribunal’s treatment of the updated evidence or its refusal to admit the brother’s letter. Lords Justice Rix and Chadwick agreed with Lord Justice Carnwath.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal dismissed on 20 July 2005.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: appeal dismissed; decision notified on 15 October 2004.
• Adjudicator: asylum refusal upheld in a decision dated 30 September 2003.