Pleydell, R. v

Evidence that a driver was adversely affected by drugs is relevant to whether the driving was dangerous. Evidence of very recent cocaine use, coupled with expert evidence that cocaine may impair driving ability, may therefore be admitted on a charge of causing death by dangerous driving. The prosecution need not quantify the precise dose where the evidence is capable of showing recent use and a potential material effect on driving. The illegality of cocaine is not itself the basis for admissibility.

The appellant was convicted at Lewes Crown Court of causing the death of his passenger by dangerous driving after his car lost control and struck a parked vehicle. A blood sample taken about three hours after the collision tested positive for cocaine and cannabis.

The prosecution relied on evidence that unchanged cocaine in the blood indicated recent use and that cocaine could impair driving ability. The appellant denied taking cocaine shortly before the collision and argued that, without quantitative evidence or expert evidence of actual impairment, the cocaine evidence was inadmissible.

On appeal against conviction, the central issue was whether the trial judge correctly admitted that evidence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge correctly admitted the evidence of cocaine in the appellant’s blood sample.

2. The court accepted the principle reflected in R v Woodward [1995] 2 Cr App R 388 that a driver’s adverse impairment by alcohol is relevant to whether the driving was dangerous. The same is true of impairment by drugs. If the jury found that the appellant was adversely affected by drugs, that fact was relevant to dangerous driving and directly relevant to the alternative count alleging careless driving while unfit through drugs.

3. The evidence went materially further than proof that the appellant had merely used a substance at an unspecified time. It was capable of showing recent cocaine use, concealment of its timing, and a drug with a short-lived capacity to impair driving ability. Those matters made the evidence potentially relevant for the jury.

4. Precise quantification of the cocaine dose was unnecessary. The evidence did not depend on the drug’s illegality. Rather, its admissibility arose from the evidence of recent use and its potential material effect on driving. The authorities concerning unquantified or modest alcohol consumption did not require exclusion on these facts.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The appeal against conviction was dismissed on 20 May 2005.
• Crown Court at Lewes. On 17 September 2004 the appellant was convicted by a jury of causing death by dangerous driving. On 1 November 2004 he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, disqualified for five years, and ordered to take an extended retest.