GG, R v

Delay in prosecuting historic sexual allegations does not by itself justify a stay. A stay for abuse of process requires serious prejudice such that a fair trial cannot be held. Ordinarily, the jury decides credibility after an appropriate warning about the effect of delay.

Recent complaint evidence may support a complainant’s credibility if it is not wholly inconsistent with the complainant’s evidence. Any lesser inconsistency is for the jury. A general delay direction is sufficient unless identifiable prejudice requires a further specific warning. The residual jurisdiction to quash a conviction in the interests of justice is exceptional and must be exercised cautiously.

The appellant was convicted at Manchester Crown Court in 1999 of indecent assault and four specimen counts of rape alleged by his daughter to have occurred during her childhood. His renewed application for leave to appeal was refused later that year.

The Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the conviction under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. The appeal alleged that the lapse of time had caused unfair prejudice, that the directions on recent complaint, delay and good character were inadequate, and that the convictions should be quashed under the court’s residual jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the historic delay and its alleged consequences rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The convictions were safe.

2. Evidence of CA’s complaint to GE was properly admitted only as evidence capable of supporting CA’s credibility. It was not evidence that the assault had occurred. The evidence was not wholly inconsistent with CA’s account. The discrepancy between touching to the legs and touching to the breast did not assist the defence, while CA’s failure to mention the alleged rapes was a much stronger credibility point and was available to the defence.

3. A stay for abuse of process would have failed. Delay is not itself a ground for staying a prosecution. The appellant had to establish serious prejudice such that a fair trial could not be held. He retained several substantial means of testing CA’s credibility, including the contents and omissions of the earlier complaint, her later return to live with him, and the hospital evidence.

4. The trial judge’s direction adequately explained that delay could affect recollection and the ability to find witnesses, and that the jury must take this into account when deciding whether the prosecution had made them sure of guilt. No additional direction was required about missing police material, SC’s recollection, or the hospital evidence. The summing up had already identified the material matters capable of undermining CA’s credibility.

5. The standard good-character direction was full and adequate. Historic sexual allegations did not require an enhanced form of that direction.

6. The residual jurisdiction described in B, R v [2003] EWCA Crim 319 was not engaged. It is exceptional and exercised cautiously. This was not a case in which the appellant could do no more than deny the allegations; the jury had ample material by which to assess the complainant’s credibility.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, dismissed the appeal against conviction.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 26 October 1999, refused the appellant’s renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction.
• Crown Court at Manchester: On 26 and 29 March 1999, convicted the appellant of indecent assault and four counts of rape, and imposed concurrent sentences totalling eight years’ imprisonment.