Brown, R v

Sentence for manslaughter committed by deliberate driving must reflect the exceptional danger and foreseeable harm created by the offender’s conduct. A suicidal purpose does not reduce the gravity where the offender deliberately drives so as to make a collision unavoidable and thereby exposes other road users to an almost certain risk of death or serious injury.

Comparable motor-manslaughter sentences provide limited assistance. Sentencing remains fact-specific, and the absence of hostility, aggression, or alcohol or drug use does not prevent a severe sentence where the deliberate driving is exceptionally dangerous.

The applicant pleaded guilty at Luton Crown Court to manslaughter after deliberately driving at speed against the flow of traffic on the A1(M), intending to kill himself. He collided head-on with another vehicle after acting so as to prevent its driver from avoiding the collision. The passenger was killed and the driver was seriously injured.

At Chelmsford Crown Court he received ten years’ detention in a young offenders institution, a twelve-year driving disqualification, and an extended retest requirement. A dangerous-driving count was left on the file. The single judge refused leave to appeal sentence. Before the full court, the applicant sought an adjournment for further psychiatric evidence and challenged both the custodial sentence and the disqualification period.

1. The court refused leave to appeal against the ten-year period of detention. It granted leave to appeal against the twelve-year disqualification, quashed that period, and substituted an eight-year disqualification. The extended retest requirement remained.

2. There was no basis to adjourn for a further psychiatric report. The existing psychiatric evidence disclosed no mental illness and did not support a psychiatric disposal. The suggestion of an undisclosed mental disability came only from the applicant’s understandably concerned family and was speculative.

3. The sentencing judge correctly treated the offence as substantially more serious than causing death by dangerous driving. Although the applicant did not intend to kill or seriously injure another person, he deliberately drove at high speed in a manner that made death or serious injury to others very likely. He used the vehicle as a means of attempting suicide while exposing other road users to an inevitable and grave danger. His conduct included preventing the other driver from avoiding the collision.

4. The applicant’s youth, effective good character, injuries, distress following the end of his relationship, and guilty plea were considered. The plea carried little weight because it was inevitable on the facts. The court agreed that sentencing comparisons in motor-manslaughter cases are necessarily fact-specific: R v Ballard [2005] 2 Cr App R (S)186 confirmed that no two cases are alike. The absence of aggression towards the public or alcohol or drug consumption did not lessen the exceptional seriousness of this deliberate driving.

5. The custodial sentence was severe, particularly for a young offender, but was not one with which the court should interfere in the exceptional circumstances.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The court refused leave to appeal against the period of detention. It allowed the appeal against disqualification to the limited extent of substituting an eight-year period for twelve years.

• Chelmsford Crown Court: On 11 May 2005, imposed ten years’ detention in a young offenders institution for manslaughter, a twelve-year driving disqualification, and an extended retest requirement.

• Luton Crown Court: On 28 April 2005, the applicant pleaded guilty to manslaughter.