National Assembly for Wales, Re The Town & Country Planning Act 1990

Under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 54(a), a development plan attracts a statutory presumption, but it does not determine every application conclusively. A decision-maker may depart from the plan where material considerations indicate that course. A proposal’s lack of materially harmful encroachment into the countryside may itself be a material planning consideration. The weight given to that consideration is for the decision-maker, subject to rationality. On review, the court asks whether the decision-maker had regard to the statutory presumption, considered relevant matters, and reached a rational decision. It does not reweigh competing planning considerations.

Pembrokeshire County Council refused outline planning permission for a dwelling partly outside the defined settlement boundary at Green Grove, Princes Gate, Narberth. The planning inspector allowed the applicant’s appeal and granted outline permission.

The Council brought a statutory challenge under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The highway-safety objection was not pursued. The central issue was whether the inspector had lawfully treated the proposal’s limited effect on the surrounding countryside as a material consideration capable of outweighing conflict with the local plan.

1. The statutory challenge failed and the inspector’s decision was upheld. The claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, summarily assessed at £2,981.
2. Section 54(a) created a presumption in favour of determining the application in accordance with the development plan, but permitted departure where material considerations indicated otherwise. Applying City of Edinburgh Council v Secretary of State for Scotland [1997] 1 WLR 1447, the court’s review was limited. It had to ask whether the inspector had regard to the statutory presumption, considered matters legally capable of being material, and reached a rational decision.
3. The inspector had not expressly cited section 54(a), but paragraphs 2 to 5 of his decision letter showed that he understood and applied the statutory approach.
4. The inspector’s references to reasonable rationalisation of the settlement boundary and the absence of materially harmful encroachment into the countryside had to be read together. Properly understood, he had identified the relevant material circumstance.
5. Following the planning-purpose approach in Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates PLC (1985) 1 AC 661, the absence of materially harmful effect on the character and appearance of the countryside was capable of being a material planning consideration. The fact that a common objection to development outside a settlement boundary was absent could itself be material.
6. The weight to be given to that consideration, against the development-plan presumption, was for the inspector. The court could interfere with that planning balance only for irrationality or perversity. No such flaw was established.