Ultraframe (UK) Ltd., R (on the application of) v GMB & Ors

Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 did not confer on the Central Arbitration Committee a general supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of a recognition ballot. The ballot had to be conducted by the qualified independent person, subject to the express statutory provisions governing the CAC’s functions. Once informed of the result, the CAC was required by paragraph 29 to issue the appropriate declaration. The court could not fill the statutory gap by implying a power to investigate alleged irregularities or order a fresh ballot. Any challenge to the ballot had to be pursued through the courts. The CAC’s decision to order a re-run was therefore quashed.

Two unions sought recognition to conduct collective bargaining for a bargaining unit of weekly paid workers employed by Ultraframe. A postal ballot produced a majority in favour of recognition, but fell four votes short of the statutory requirement that at least 40 per cent of the bargaining unit support recognition.

The unions complained that several workers had not received ballot papers. The CAC investigated, found that five workers had not been given a fair opportunity to vote, and ordered a fresh ballot. Ultraframe sought judicial review, arguing that the CAC lacked jurisdiction to investigate the ballot or order a re-run, that the hearing was procedurally unfair, and that the decision was irrational.

1. The natural justice challenge failed. The jurisdictional issue was known to be in dispute, and the parties had addressed whether paragraphs 22 to 29 of Schedule A1 conferred the necessary power.

2. Paragraph 29 used mandatory language. Once informed of the ballot result, the CAC had to make the relevant declaration as soon as reasonably practicable. That phrase concerned timing and could not be read as permitting the CAC to delay action while investigating complaints that something had gone wrong.

3. Paragraph 25(2) expressly required the ballot to be conducted by the qualified independent person. The Schedule made specific provision for CAC involvement in matters such as the ballot’s timing and method, and for remedial orders where an employer had failed to comply with its duties before the ballot. Those provisions did not support a general power to supervise the ballot or cure other alleged irregularities.

4. Paragraph 23(2) required the CAC to arrange a secret ballot. Its reference to workers being asked whether they wanted recognition described the nature and purpose of the ballot; it did not impose a continuing supervisory obligation or authorise the CAC to order a new ballot. Paragraph 171 was ancillary to the CAC’s existing functions and could not itself create jurisdiction.

5. The purposive arguments based on the CAC’s specialist role and the desirability of speedy dispute resolution could not contradict the statutory language. The identified lacuna required legislative amendment, not judicial trench-filling. The CAC therefore had no jurisdiction to order a re-run, and its decision was quashed. In any event, had jurisdiction existed, the judge indicated that the CAC’s conclusion that five workers lacked a fair opportunity to vote would also have been unsustainable: the available replacement-ballot procedure had not been pursued with due expedition.