Brooker v Director of Public Prosecutions

Section 139(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is not confined to articles with a sharp blade or point. A sharp blade or pointed instrument is the paradigm case, but the statutory words cover any article having a blade within the relevant knife-like category. The court should avoid an interpretation which requires repeated factual argument about whether an article is sufficiently sharp. The question is one of statutory construction. The fact that an article originated as a butter knife does not determine the issue.

The claimant appealed by way of case stated against his conviction by Bexley Magistrates’ Court for possessing a bladed article in a public place, contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The article was a 10-centimetre butter-knife blade without a handle, cutting edge or point. The magistrates concluded that it fell within section 139(2). The central issue was whether such a blunt, unpointed blade was an article to which the statutory prohibition applied.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The question in the stated case was answered in the affirmative: the magistrates were correct to conclude that the article fell within section 139(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
2. The statutory question was one of construction. Section 139(2) uses unqualified language referring to any article which has a blade, subject to the statutory exceptions. Section 139(3), concerning folding pocketknives with cutting edges exceeding three inches, provides relevant context but does not make sharpness a universal requirement.
3. A sharp blade or pointed instrument is the paradigm case addressed by the provision. That does not mean that only an inherently dangerous, sharp or pointed blade is covered. The court rejected the claimant’s proposed limitation.
4. The decision in R v Davies [1998] Crim LR 564 did not establish that only sharp blades fall within section 139(2). It concerned the precise question whether a screwdriver was covered and was explained as supporting a knife-like statutory category, rather than the broader proposition advanced by the claimant.
5. The Prevention of Crime Act 1953 did not alter the construction. Section 139 was intended to complement that legislation, rather than fill a supposed lacuna in it.

• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal by way of case stated and affirmed the magistrates’ conclusion.
• Bexley Magistrates’ Court: convicted the claimant on 18 August 2004 under section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.