Clayton v HM Coroner for South Yorkshire (East District) & Ors

Under s 13 of the Coroners Act 1988, irregularity in managing a coroner’s jury may justify a fresh inquest where it creates a real possibility of a materially different lawful verdict. A majority direction must not be supplemented by time pressure or encouragement to compromise. A Watson direction and a majority direction should not be combined. Even where the jury was misdirected, the court need not quash the inquisition if the available evidence makes a materially different verdict highly unlikely.

The claimant, with the Attorney General’s fiat, challenged an open verdict returned at the inquest into his son’s death during a police arrest. He alleged that the coroner and his officer had improperly pressured the jury and that the coroner had misdirected them when they were deadlocked.

The court rejected the allegation concerning the coroner’s officer for want of proof. It then considered whether the coroner’s directions amounted to an irregularity under s 13 of the Coroners Act 1988, and whether another inquest was necessary or desirable in the interests of justice.

1. Application dismissed. The inquisition was not quashed and no fresh inquest was ordered, although the coroner had misdirected the jury. There was no order for costs, save that the claimant’s publicly funded costs were to be assessed.
2. The integrity of jury deliberations in a coroner’s court requires the same protection as in the criminal courts. A jury must not be subjected to pressure, especially pressure of time. A majority direction may facilitate a verdict, but it must not be accompanied by improper encouragement to reach one.
3. The coroner’s reference to it being a pity, and his regret, if the jury had to be discharged, together with his offer of a little more time, went beyond the permissible Watson direction. The coroner also improperly combined that direction with the majority direction. The two directions should be kept separate, because a majority direction is itself designed to facilitate agreement.
4. Those matters amounted to an irregularity of proceedings within s 13(1)(b) of the Coroners Act 1988. The allegation that the coroner’s officer imposed a deadline failed for want of proof.
5. A fresh inquest would be necessary or desirable in the interests of justice if the available evidence disclosed a real possibility that a properly directed jury would conclude that the death had been caused by unlawful violence inflicted by police officers. On the evidence, the deceased’s vulnerable heart, the medical evidence and the absence of pathological evidence of unlawful violence made such a verdict highly unlikely. A fresh inquest could not be expected to produce an appreciably different result.
6. The Human Rights Act 1998 did not affect the analysis because the death pre-dated its commencement. There was no freestanding Article 2 obligation to investigate in those circumstances.

First-instance judicial review application under s 13 of the Coroners Act 1988. No earlier judicial decision is stated in the judgment.