HM Attorney General v Foden

For a Civil Proceedings Order under Supreme Court Act 1981, the court must assess the litigant’s conduct in the round. It may, and generally should, examine the whole history rather than an isolated pleading or proceeding. The court should not re-try the merits of the earlier litigation, but may rely on the conclusions reached by the judges who decided it. Habitual and persistent litigation is vexatious where the litigant repeatedly pursues unsuccessful claims, appeals or collateral proceedings without reasonable grounds, particularly where the proceedings seek to reopen matters already determined. A continuing pattern that wastes judicial resources may justify an order prohibiting further civil proceedings without leave, indefinitely.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for a Civil Proceedings Order against Veronica Beryl Foden. The application relied on a long history of civil claims, appeals, judicial review proceedings and collateral applications, many of which sought to revisit concluded disputes. The defendant repeatedly sought adjournments on medical grounds and did not attend the substantive hearing, although she had supplied written evidence and continued to litigate. The central issues were whether the proceedings demonstrated habitual and persistent vexatious litigation without reasonable ground, and whether the substantive application should be adjourned.

1. The application for a further adjournment was refused. The defendant had been given repeated opportunities, the court had considered her written materials, and nothing had changed since the order directing substantive disposal. Her continuing inability to attend did not prevent determination of the application.
2. Under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the court must assess whether the defendant had habitually and persistently, and without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious civil proceedings or made vexatious applications. In deciding whether proceedings were vexatious, the court was entitled, and perhaps obliged, to examine the whole history rather than an individual pleading: In Re Vernazza [1959] 1 WLR 622, 624.
3. The characteristic vice was persistent continuation of unsuccessful litigation, repeated challenges to adverse decisions, attempts to sue successive parties over the same underlying dispute, and refusal to accept orders or judgments. This formulation was taken from Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759, 764.
4. The court was not required to revisit the merits of the earlier proceedings. It could rely on the conclusions reached by the judges who had determined them: Attorney General v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859, 863.
5. The defendant’s 33 actions displayed a repeated attempt to reopen property disputes, challenge professional advisers and judges, pursue collateral attacks, and continue applications after adverse decisions. The litigation was wholly without merit, clearly vexatious, and wasteful of scarce judicial resources. The application for a Civil Proceedings Order was granted without limit of time. Mr Justice David Steel agreed.