HM Attorney General v Doswell

For an order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the court may consider the litigant’s whole history of proceedings. The relevant circumstances include repeated and baseless claims or applications, persistence after adverse rulings, and the inconvenience, harassment and expense caused to parties and court staff. A recent cessation of proceedings does not prevent an order where the history and present conduct establish a real danger of repetition. The order may prohibit the institution of proceedings or making of applications without leave of the court.

The Attorney General applied for a civil proceedings order against Mr Doswell under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Between 2000 and 2003, Mr Doswell had brought 13 unsuccessful actions or applications concerning disputes with Nottingham City Council, the police, the Home Office and the courts. Earlier proceedings had led Potter LJ to indicate that he might be a candidate for a civil restraint or extended civil restraint order. No fresh proceedings had been issued since September 2004, but the court had to determine whether the history and Mr Doswell’s continuing submissions demonstrated a sufficient danger of further vexatious proceedings.

1. The application for an order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 was granted. The Attorney General’s evidence established the statutory conditions.
2. In deciding whether such an order is necessary, the court must examine the whole history of the proceedings. The relevant history included 13 actions or applications, all unsuccessful, which repeatedly sought to reopen grievances arising from earlier injunction and criminal proceedings. The proceedings had no proper legal foundation and bore the hallmarks of a litigant unwilling to accept judicial rulings.
3. The court was entitled to take account of the repetitious way in which the proceedings had been brought and their deleterious effects, including inconvenience, harassment and expense to the opposing parties and court staff. Those matters demonstrated a real danger that, without protection, Mr Doswell would continue to air his grievances through fresh and repetitious proceedings.
4. The fact that no fresh proceedings had been launched since September 2004 did not remove that danger. The continuing volume of material produced, the history of repeated applications and the submissions made at the hearing confirmed the need for an order. The dicta of Parker CJ in R v Velatza were treated as supporting consideration of the whole history.
5. The order would prevent Mr Doswell, without leave of the court, from instituting proceedings or making applications. Any question concerning enforcement of a breach was separate from the making of the section 42 order. Mr Justice Stanley Burnton agreed that the conditions were amply fulfilled.