Hewitson, Re Habeas Corpus

In an accusation case under the Extradition Act 1989, the Secretary of State need only have sufficient information to justify issuing an arrest warrant. Where independently sufficient material exists, the court need not determine the consequences of any alleged reliance on unlawfully obtained material.

A conviction in the requested state’s absence does not engage the statutory protection for a person unlawfully at large following conviction where the extradition request concerns an accusation. A return will not be unjust or oppressive under section 11(3)(c) where the person has an absolute right to set aside the conviction on returning to the requested state.

The claimant sought habeas corpus against his committal for extradition to France. French authorities alleged that he organised the transportation of cannabis resin. A previous Divisional Court had held that a letter recovered from his premises was unlawfully seized.

France later convicted the claimant in his absence. The claimant argued that the Secretary of State had relied on material referring to the unlawfully seized letter and that his return would be unjust or oppressive because of the absent conviction and the lack of legal representation. The central issues were whether section 7(2) was satisfied and whether sections 6 or 11(3)(c) prevented return.

1. Application dismissed. The court treated the claimant as an accused person, so the request fell under section 1(1)(a) of the Extradition Act 1989, rather than the provisions governing a person unlawfully at large following conviction.
2. Section 7(2) required sufficient information to justify issuing an arrest warrant. The material before the Secretary of State included the accusations of Andrew and Timothy Wright, their links with the claimant’s Spanish villa, telephone numbers in his name, and keys and a remote device for the villa. That material was independently sufficient.
3. The court therefore did not need to decide what consequences would follow if the Secretary of State had relied on unlawfully obtained material or if such reliance breached Article 8. The judgment expressly proceeded on the assumption that the claimant’s underlying legal proposition might be correct.
4. Section 6 did not apply because the extradition request was accusation-based, not based on the claimant being unlawfully at large following conviction. Under section 11(3)(c), the claimant had to show that the accusation was not made in good faith in the interests of justice and that, having regard to all the circumstances, return would be unjust or oppressive. There was no such suggestion on the facts.
5. The absent conviction did not make return oppressive. The claimant had an absolute right to set aside the conviction and sentence by lodging an objection within ten days of arrival in France. The case was accordingly distinguishable from Krombach v France, where no such right existed, and analogous to Foy v the Governor of Her Majesty’s Prison of Brixton and the Government of France. Richards J agreed that the information independently satisfied section 7(2).

The judgment records an earlier Divisional Court decision concerning the search of the claimant’s premises: [2003] EWHC 3296 (Admin). That court ordered return of the property and damages. The present court dismissed the subsequent habeas corpus application.