Babar v Anis

A bare licensee occupies premises under a licence terminable on reasonable notice. The relevant question is whether sufficient time elapsed for a person in the licensee’s circumstances to find alternative accommodation. The court will assess that question factually, including the licensee’s resources, support network, employment and actual efforts to relocate.

A promissory estoppel defence fails where the alleged promises or representations are not proved. An undertaking given for immigration purposes does not necessarily establish such a defence on its own.

The claimant sought possession of a leasehold flat and damages or mesne profits from the defendant, who occupied it after entering into an Islamic marriage ceremony with him in Pakistan. The defendant relied principally on promissory estoppel, alternatively contending that she had not received reasonable notice to terminate her licence. She also counterclaimed for deceit.

Earlier possession proceedings brought by the claimant’s former wife were dismissed at first instance. The Court of Appeal allowed the former wife’s appeal in [2003] EWCA Civ 1253, requiring the validity of the parties’ marriage and the alleged matrimonial home rights to be investigated. The marriage was subsequently annulled. The issues before the court were whether the factual basis for promissory estoppel or deceit was established and, if not, whether the notice given was sufficient.

1. Promissory estoppel and deceit. The court preferred the claimant’s evidence and found that no representation had been made that he was divorced, that the defendant would enter into a valid English marriage, or that she could occupy the flat indefinitely. The evidence established only permission to stay for the time being. The factual basis for both promissory estoppel and deceit therefore failed.
2. The claimant’s sponsorship declaration contained an undertaking to maintain, support and accommodate the defendant during her stay in the United Kingdom. It was not contended that the declaration alone founded a promissory estoppel defence. The court accordingly left that legal question open.
3. Notice. In the absence of promissory estoppel, the defendant was a bare licensee and the licence was terminable on reasonable notice. Following Minister of Health v Belotti [1944] KB 298, the relevant question was whether the period allowed was sufficient for a person in the defendant’s circumstances to find alternative accommodation.
4. The defendant was employed, had a bank account, could seek assistance from persons known to her, and had consulted solicitors. There was no evidence that she lacked funds or had made efforts to obtain alternative accommodation. Her reason for remaining was to use possession as leverage in relation to her immigration position. The period between service of the notice and commencement of proceedings was sufficient.
5. The claim succeeded and the counterclaim was dismissed. The court was to hear submissions on the consequential order if not agreed.

The judgment records earlier proceedings brought by the claimant’s former wife in the Wandsworth County Court. The first-instance possession claim was dismissed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in [2003] EWCA Civ 1253 and directed that the marriage and any matrimonial home rights be investigated. The marriage was subsequently annulled before the present possession claim was determined in the High Court.