Conville v London Borough of Richmond-Upon-Thames

Under section 190(2)(a) of the Housing Act 1996, a local authority must provide intentionally homeless applicants in priority need with accommodation for a period which gives them a reasonable opportunity to secure accommodation. The assessment is applicant-specific, but the authority may also consider its resources, housing demand and the needs of other homeless applicants. Under section 190(2)(b), the duty to provide advice and assistance may include a power to provide financial assistance, but it does not impose a duty to secure accommodation or to fund a deposit and rent in advance. A lawful scheme may exclude intentionally homeless applicants, provided the authority does not treat its scheme criteria as removing its residual discretion to assist in exceptional cases.

The claimant, who had been found intentionally homeless and in priority need, challenged four decisions of the defendant local authority concerning the duration of accommodation, assessment of housing needs, and refusal of financial assistance towards a deposit and rent in advance.

The claimant contended that the authority had failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to secure accommodation, had failed to assess her housing needs, and had unlawfully fettered its discretion by relying on a rent deposit scheme which excluded intentionally homeless applicants. The authority maintained that it had complied with its statutory duties and had lawfully exercised its discretion.

1. Reasonable opportunity. The duty under section 190(2)(a) arose when the authority determined that the claimant was intentionally homeless, on 22 February 2005. The authority was entitled to take account of earlier events when assessing the length of the reasonable opportunity, although those events were only one factor.
2. The phrase “reasonable opportunity” required consideration of both the claimant’s individual circumstances and the authority’s position. Relevant matters included the claimant’s financial difficulties, available resources, housing demand, and competing demands from applicants who were not intentionally homeless. The authority was not required to provide accommodation indefinitely until funding became available. Its decision of 8 June adequately discharged the duty.
3. Housing-needs assessment. The claimant accepted that, by the June decisions, the authority possessed the necessary information. The challenge to the earlier absence of a written assessment was therefore academic and was not determined.
4. Financial assistance. The duty under section 190(2)(b) was to provide assistance to secure accommodation, not to secure accommodation itself. It included a power to provide financial assistance. That power was reviewable on conventional public-law grounds, including failure to consider a material matter, consideration of an immaterial matter, or perversity.
5. A rent deposit scheme could lawfully exclude intentionally homeless applicants. The authority could consider the scheme’s eligibility criteria and funding position when deciding whether to provide assistance outside the scheme. It could not, however, treat those criteria as conclusively preventing the exercise of its discretionary power under section 190(2)(b).
6. By 8 and 9 June the authority had considered the claimant’s circumstances, the available properties, the financial barrier, the scheme’s criteria and funding, and whether the case was exceptional. Its refusal of financial assistance was lawful and adequately reasoned. The judicial review application was refused. Permission to appeal was refused and would in any event have been academic.

First-instance judicial review application refused. Permission to appeal was refused.