Parker v Director of Public Prosecutions

The omission of a prohibition from a final anti-social behaviour order does not, by itself, reduce the gravity of an earlier breach of the same prohibition in an interim order. The seriousness of the breach depends on all the circumstances, including the conduct constituting the breach, its flagrancy, the time elapsed since the order, and repetition. The interim and final stages involve decisions based on the material available at each stage, but the final order’s terms do not determine the seriousness of an earlier breach.

The claimant appealed by way of case stated against the Portsmouth Crown Court’s dismissal of his appeal against sentence imposed by the South East Hants Juvenile Youth Court. He had received concurrent detention and training orders for breaches of interim anti-social behaviour orders. The breaches involved associating with a person named in the interim orders, although the non-association prohibition was absent from the final order.

The central issue was whether that omission made the breaches less serious for sentencing purposes.

1. The appeal by way of case stated was dismissed. The Crown Court had been correct to conclude that breach of a condition in an interim anti-social behaviour order could be as serious as breach of a condition replicated in the final order.

2. Under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, as amended, an interim order may be made where the court considers it just pending determination of the main application. The prohibitions imposed at either stage must be necessary to protect persons from further anti-social acts, judged by the material before the court on the relevant occasion.

3. The fact that a prohibition appears in an interim order but not in the final order does not itself affect the gravity of a breach of the interim prohibition. There may be many reasons why a condition considered necessary at the interim stage is not included in the final order.

4. Sentencing must instead consider all the circumstances. Relevant matters may include the nature of the conduct, the flagrancy of the breach, the time between the making of the order and the breach, and whether the breach was repeated. A breach shortly after the order may be particularly serious, and repetition may aggravate the sentence.

5. The court granted leave to challenge by judicial review the delay in stating the case. It permitted argument that the delay might justify a reduction in sentence under sections 6 and 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The judicial review proceedings were ordered to be expedited, and the claimant’s bail was continued on the existing terms.

• High Court (Administrative Court) — The appeal by way of case stated was dismissed. Leave was granted for judicial review of the Crown Court’s delay in stating the case.
• Portsmouth Crown Court — On 13 August 2004, the Crown Court dismissed the claimant’s appeal against sentence imposed by the youth court.
• South East Hants Juvenile Youth Court — On 29 June 2004, detention and training orders were imposed for breaches of interim anti-social behaviour orders.