S (A Child), Re

In deciding whether parental consent to adoption is withheld unreasonably, the court applies an objective standard. The question is whether a reasonable parent in the actual parent’s circumstances would consent, having regard to the child’s welfare and the advantages of adoption. Genuine religious beliefs require respect and sensitive consideration, but they are not determinative. In a secular and pluralistic society, the court must not adjudicate the truth of competing religious doctrines. It must assess whether the parent’s reliance on those beliefs, in the circumstances of the particular child, falls outside the range of reasonable decisions. Adoption may therefore be authorised despite sincere religious objections where its welfare advantages decisively outweigh the parent’s views and interests.

The local authority applied for a freeing order concerning S, a six-year-old boy who had been subject to a care order and had lived in foster care since 2003. The care plan approved by Bodey J in January 2004 contemplated culturally appropriate adoption if suitable adopters could be found. Suitable practising Muslim adopters of Pakistani origin were eventually identified, and the children’s guardian supported the placement.

S’s mother opposed adoption on religious and welfare grounds. She sought his return or, alternatively, direct contact. The central issues were whether adoption remained in S’s best interests under section 6 of the Adoption Act 1976, and whether the parents were withholding consent unreasonably under section 16(2)(b).

1. Adoption and welfare. Adoption remained plainly in S’s best interests under section 6 of the Adoption Act 1976. The delay since the earlier care decision did not alter the question, which was whether adoption remained appropriate at the date of the hearing. S could not remain with his foster carers, rehabilitation to his birth family was not realistic, and the proposed adopters offered permanence, stability, cultural compatibility and security.
2. Objective standard. Under section 16(2)(b), the court had to ask whether a reasonable parent in the circumstances of the actual parent would regard consent as reasonable. The test was objective, but it required consideration of the parent’s actual circumstances, beliefs and experiences. Genuine belief, grievance or distress was not determinative.
3. Religious objection. The mother’s Islamic beliefs were sincere and reasonable in themselves. They nevertheless did not control the decision. A secular court must respect religious diversity and avoid choosing between religious doctrines, but parental religious freedom is qualified by the rights and welfare of the child. Section 7 of the Adoption Act 1976 required regard to parental wishes about religious upbringing only so far as practicable. The question remained whether, applying current societal values, the advantages of adoption were sufficiently strong to justify overriding the mother’s religious and other interests.
4. Application. The mother’s objections based on delay, grievance, alleged ability to parent, S’s age, and loss of family contact lacked an objective basis. Taken individually and cumulatively, they did not make refusal reasonable. Her religious objection likewise did not do so, because S needed a permanent family and the welfare advantages of the proposed adoption were overwhelming. The father, who had abandoned practical responsibility and had not seen S since 2003, was also withholding consent unreasonably.
5. Order. The freeing order sought by the local authority was made. The existing arrangements concerning contact were continued without change.