Smith, R (on the application of) v Bristol Crown Court & Anor

A Crown Court’s discretion to extend custody time limits must be exercised by reference to the statutory requirement for good and sufficient cause and after rigorous scrutiny. Limited judicial resources may be relevant, but the court must make considerable endeavours to avoid postponing the trial beyond the applicable limit. A lack of resources caused by failing to seek an alternative judge or venue does not ordinarily constitute sufficient cause. The court must also consider the defendant’s period in custody and any previous extensions. Judicial review asks whether the discretion was wrongly exercised, not whether the Administrative Court would have reached the same decision.

The claimant sought judicial review of a ruling by His Honour Judge Ticehurst extending custody time limits in criminal proceedings. The claimant had been in custody for nearly a year and the extension was the third. The trial had been moved because the allocated judge gave priority to an urgent family case in which he was also sitting. The Crown accepted that it had acted with due diligence and expedition.

The issue was whether the Crown Court had lawfully found a good and sufficient cause under section 22 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 when the trial could not proceed on the listed date because no alternative judge or venue had been secured.

1. Decision quashed. The extension of the custody time limits was unlawful and was quashed.
2. Section 22(3) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 conferred a discretion on the Crown Court judge. The Administrative Court had to respect that discretion, but had to intervene where it had been exercised on a basis that was not properly open to the judge.
3. The governing question was not whether the Administrative Court would itself have extended the limits. It was whether the Crown Court judge had wrongly exercised his discretion. The Crown Court’s primacy was subject to rigorous scrutiny, particularly because the defendant’s liberty was at stake.
4. The availability of judges and courtrooms could constitute a relevant consideration. However, following R (ex parte Gibson) v Crown Court at Winchester [2004] 1 WLR 1623, the court had to make considerable endeavours to avoid postponement beyond the custody time limit and the court and parties had to strive to overcome difficulties.
5. Here, the apparent lack of resources resulted substantially from the judge’s instructions not to inform the parties earlier and not to seek an alternative judge. It was therefore insufficient simply to state that no judge was available on the later date. The judge had to address why resources were unavailable and should have considered the nearly year-long detention and the fact that this was the third extension application.
6. The defendant’s antecedents and the likelihood that bail might be refused could not properly dictate the outcome. Following the quashing order, the claimant was to be brought promptly before the Bristol Crown Court for bail to be addressed. A Legal Aid order was made and there was no order as to costs.