Phipps v General Medical Council

In a professional disciplinary case, a practitioner cannot answer dishonest misrepresentations influencing accreditation by showing that the accreditation might otherwise have been justified. The relevant issue is whether the inaccurate information materially influenced the decision. Where deception influences an administrative result, the court does not assess the relative importance of other contributing causes. A disciplinary tribunal need not determine the practitioner’s underlying entitlement to accreditation. Once dishonest representations have influenced the grant, the accreditation may properly be treated as vitiated by deception. The availability of legal aid under Article 6(1) depends on the particular facts, including the importance of the proceedings, the complexity of the law and procedure, and the applicant’s ability to represent himself.

The appellant appealed under the Medical Act 1983 against the Professional Conduct Committee’s finding that he was guilty of serious professional misconduct. The Committee found that he had made inaccurate and dishonest statements about his surgical training and publications, and that those statements had influenced the retrospective grant of higher surgical training accreditation and his subsequent appointment as a consultant surgeon.

The appellant argued that he was in any event entitled to accreditation, that the Committee had misdirected itself, and that he had been denied a fair hearing because he had been required to represent himself after the withdrawal of legal support. The central issues were whether the misrepresentations influenced accreditation and whether the proceedings complied with Article 6(1).

1. The appeal was dismissed. The Committee’s findings were supported by the evidence. The appellant had represented locum posts as senior registrar or substantive posts and had omitted material qualifications about their status and duration.
2. The question was whether the record card contained misrepresentations, whether they influenced the accreditation decision, whether they were dishonest or innocent, and whether the conduct amounted to professional misconduct. The appellant’s underlying entitlement to accreditation was not the issue in the disciplinary charges. Accreditation was a grant which did not exist merely because the underlying facts might have satisfied the relevant criteria.
3. Applying Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104 P.C., where deception has influenced an administrative result, the court does not examine the relative importance of contributory causes. It was therefore no answer to show that other, more substantial matters might have supported accreditation. The evidence established that the inaccurate statements on the record card had influenced the decision.
4. The Committee was not required to decide the basis on which accreditation had been granted or whether the appellant would have qualified if accurate information had been supplied. The dishonest misrepresentations vitiated the grant for the purposes of the disciplinary case. The Committee had not been misled by considering the appellant’s claimed entitlement while assessing the charges.
5. The Article 6(1) complaint failed. Following the approach in Steel and Morris v UK and McVicar v UK, the need for legal aid depended on the particular circumstances. The proceedings before the Committee were relatively informal, the GMC bore the burden of proof, the legal issues were straightforward, the central factual issue was within the appellant’s knowledge, he had previously received legal assistance, and he had represented himself capably. No specific prejudice was demonstrated.
6. Under Gupta v GMC [2002] 1 WLR 1691, the Committee was not generally obliged to give reasons for finding the factual charges proved. Greater specificity in the charges and reasons was desirable, but the appellant understood the case against him and could not demonstrate an error of law or fact. The agreed order dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs, save that the appellant’s costs were to be assessed and paid by the Legal Services Commission.

• Professional Conduct Committee of the General Medical Council: On 28 October 2004, found the appellant guilty of serious professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for twelve months.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Dismissed the statutory appeal. The Committee had made no material error of law or fact, and the appellant had received a fair hearing.