L v Inner London Crown Court

A Crown Court hearing a criminal sentencing appeal must approach the matter afresh and decide the sentence which it considers right on all the material before it. It must not merely review whether the lower court could properly have imposed the sentence. In youth cases, the court must apply the statutory framework governing the welfare of children, the prevention of offending, and the custody threshold. Where the Crown Court adopts the wrong legal approach, the Administrative Court may intervene despite the usual reluctance to interfere with sentencing decisions. A quashed sentence may be remitted for reconsideration where an up-to-date assessment is required.

The claimant, aged 15, sought judicial review of the Inner London Crown Court’s dismissal of his appeal against a four-month detention and training order imposed by Camberwell Green Youth Court. The sentence related principally to breaches of an anti-social behaviour order. The claimant argued that the Crown Court had failed to consider the recent progress made under an intensive supervision and surveillance programme and had treated the appeal as a review of the Youth Court’s decision rather than as a rehearing.

The central issues were whether the Crown Court had applied the correct approach to a sentencing appeal and whether the sentence should be quashed or replaced by the Administrative Court.

1. The sentence was quashed. The court was ordinarily slow to interfere with a Crown Court decision, particularly one made on appeal from a magistrates’ court. That restraint did not prevent intervention where the Crown Court adopted an approach which was wrong in law.
2. The Crown Court had not approached the sentencing appeal afresh. Its remarks showed that it had asked whether the sentence imposed by the Youth Court was excessive or properly available, rather than deciding what sentence was right on all the matters before it. That was the wrong question. The relevant principle, identified in R v Swindon Crown Court ex parte Murray, was applicable.
3. The sentencing courts had also been required to apply the statutory youth justice framework. This included the welfare of children, the principal aim of preventing offending under section 37(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1988, and the custody threshold in section 79(2) of the Powers of Criminal Court Sentencing Act 2000. The material before the Crown Court indicated that the intensive supervision programme had not failed and that the claimant was vulnerable in custody.
4. The court considered that the Crown Court’s approach was comparable to that criticised in R v Swindon Crown Court ex parte Murray. The claimant was entitled to have the Crown Court determine the appropriate sentence, not merely review whether the Youth Court could have reached its decision.
5. The matter was remitted to the Inner London Crown Court. Although section 43 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 raised a possible power to substitute a sentence, the court did not decide the true construction of that provision. It considered that the Crown Court should receive an up-to-date report on the claimant’s progress and any relevant report arising from his custody.

1. Camberwell Green Youth Court: imposed a four-month detention and training order on 20 May 2005.
2. Inner London Crown Court: dismissed the claimant’s appeal and upheld the sentence on 27 May 2005.
3. High Court (Administrative Court): quashed the sentence and remitted the matter to the Inner London Crown Court.