Bealey, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Judicial review of a decision concerning transfer to open prison conditions is not an appeal on the merits. A decision-maker need not rehearse every favourable and unfavourable matter in the dossier, provided the reasons explain the material area of disagreement with the Parole Board. A requirement that a prisoner undergo further risk assessment is not irrational merely because professional opinion is divided. It is sufficient that there is respectable professional support for the assessment and for its potential usefulness in the particular case. A decision-maker may continue to rely on concerns arising from an earlier, lawful decision where those concerns remain unresolved. Allegations of bad faith require cogent evidence and are not established merely by inadequate reasons, failure to take account of a matter, or an allegedly irrational conclusion.

The claimant, serving a life sentence for murder, sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision not to accept a Parole Board recommendation that he be transferred to open conditions. The Parole Board considered that his risk of further serious offending was sufficiently low and accepted evidence from an independent psychologist, including an HCR20 assessment. The Secretary of State remained concerned about the claimant’s refusal to undertake a Structured Assessment of Risk and Needs (SARN), his account of the offence, and the adequacy of risk and treatment assessment. The claimant alleged failure to consider material evidence, improper purpose, inadequate reasons and irrationality. The central issue was whether the decision letter disclosed an error of public law.

Application dismissed. The decision letter was lawful.

1. The proceedings were a judicial review, not an appeal on the merits. The court’s task was to identify public-law errors, including failure to consider material matters, inadequate reasons or irrationality.
2. The Secretary of State had not ignored the independent psychologist’s HCR20 assessment. Although the assessment was not mentioned expressly, the letter addressed the Parole Board’s acceptance of the psychologist’s evidence and explained why less weight was placed on the report.
3. The Secretary of State was not required to rehearse every matter in the dossier. It was sufficient to explain the area of disagreement with the Parole Board. Given the conflicting professional views, he was entitled to prefer the views opposing transfer to open conditions.
4. The requirement to undertake SARN did not cross the high irrationality threshold. There was professional disagreement about its general utility, but respectable professional opinion supported its use and considered that it could assist in assessing risk and treatment needs in this case.
5. The earlier rejection of a Parole Board recommendation had not been challenged and was lawful. The Secretary of State was therefore entitled to remain concerned that the claimant had not addressed the matters previously identified.
6. The decision was not based on an irrational presupposition that the claimant was a sexual offender. SARN did not require him to change his account of the offence, although refusal to acknowledge a sexual element could limit the assessment. In any event, the Secretary of State’s view that the offence had a sexual element was not irrational given the uncertainty and the strong sexual overtones of the claimant’s own account.

The judge expressed regret that the proceedings had deferred the next Parole Board review.