Hardy & Anor, R (on the application of) v Pembrokeshire County Council

A judicial review claim must be brought promptly, not merely within the three-month outer limit. Delay is assessed practically, including prejudice to developers, reliance on permissions, project momentum, certainty and good administration. European environmental obligations do not displace reasonable domestic time limits where an effective remedy remains available.

The claimants sought permission to challenge planning permissions and hazardous substances consents authorising two large liquefied natural gas terminals at Milford Haven. They alleged deficiencies in environmental impact assessment, consideration of marine traffic risks and understanding of the characteristics of escaping LNG.

The defendants and interested parties argued that the claim improperly combined distinct decisions concerning separate sites and was brought late. The court therefore focused on promptness, undue delay, prejudice and good administration.

1. Permission refused. The challenges to the South Hook decisions and all but the final Dragon decision were brought well out of time. Although the final challenge was filed within three months, it was not brought promptly. The claimants and the Safe Haven group knew the substance of their concerns, had obtained legal advice and had instructed solicitors well before proceedings were issued.
2. Promptness under CPR 54.5 is assessed in its practical context. It is not measured simply by identifying the earliest practicable opportunity and allowing time for legal advice. The court must consider the effect of delay on others, particularly in planning cases. The principles in R (on the application of Lichfield Securities Ltd) v Lichfield District Council [2001] EWCA Civ 304 were applied.
3. The two terminals were separate developments with separate applications, decision-makers and environmental statements. The latest Dragon decision could not be used as a vehicle for challenging much earlier decisions. Planning permission was a highly material consideration when deciding whether to grant hazardous substances consent under section 9 of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990.
4. The delay caused substantial hardship and prejudice. The developers had entered into major contracts, incurred substantial expenditure and committed themselves to projects which had gathered commercial momentum. It would also be detrimental to good administration to reopen decisions recorded in the planning register after substantial time.
5. The importance of the environmental and human-rights issues did not require permission where the court had not heard the merits and delay, prejudice and detriment to good administration were independently sufficient. The reasoning in R (on the application of The Noble Organisation Ltd) v Thanet District Council [2005] EWCA Civ 782 was binding. R (Wells) v Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [2004] 1 CMLR 31 did not displace domestic procedural rules.
6. The application for permission to appeal was dismissed. The claimants were ordered to pay the costs of the first and second defendants. There was no order as to costs for the interested parties.

This was a first-instance decision on an application for permission to apply for judicial review. No earlier decision in the same proceedings is stated.