Boughton, R (on the application of) v Her Majesty's Treasury

A conscientious objection to the use of taxation for military expenditure does not, on the Strasbourg jurisprudence considered, amount to an interference with the Article 9 right to manifest belief. The obligation to pay tax is general and neutral, and taxpayers cannot determine how collected revenue is allocated. Under section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, domestic courts should follow clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence, including relevant Commission decisions, absent strong reason. A domestic court should not create a more generous Convention remedy by departing from that jurisprudence. Where the claim therefore has no arguable prospect of success, permission for judicial review should be refused.

The claimants, known as the Peace Tax Seven, sought judicial review of the Treasury's refusal to establish a scheme allowing taxpayers with conscientious objections to military expenditure to direct the relevant proportion of their tax to non-military purposes.

They accepted their obligation to pay tax but argued that compelled contribution to military expenditure interfered with their freedom to manifest pacifist beliefs under Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Treasury relied on Strasbourg Commission decisions, particularly C v United Kingdom, holding that Article 9 did not permit refusal to pay generally applicable taxes because revenue might fund armaments. The central issue was whether that jurisprudence could be reconsidered or displaced by the reasoning in R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Williamson.

1. Permission refused. The claim had no arguable possibility of success and would ultimately fail. There was no order as to costs.
2. Pacifism as a philosophy falls within the protection of Article 9(1), as recognised in Arrowsmith v United Kingdom and approved in principle in R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Williamson. The claimants' sincerity was accepted.
3. The decisive issue was whether refusing to pay, or seeking to segregate, the military proportion of taxation constituted manifestation of belief. The reasoning in C v United Kingdom treated taxation as a general and neutral obligation. Taxpayers have no legal power to determine how their contributions are applied, and the Convention recognises the power of taxation through Article 1 of the First Protocol. Accordingly, Article 9 did not confer a right to refuse compliance with the tax legislation.
4. The reasoning in Williamson concerning acts performed pursuant to a perceived religious, ethical or social obligation did not provide a sufficient basis for departing from the Strasbourg taxation decisions. The distinction between conduct motivated by belief and conduct dictated by belief did not alter the analysis.
5. Under section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the duty to take Strasbourg case law into account includes relevant Commission jurisprudence. Clear and constant Strasbourg reasoning should not be diluted without strong reason. Any reconsideration of the taxation issue was for Strasbourg, not this domestic court.
6. Under rule 52.15.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, an applicant refused permission to apply for judicial review at a hearing must apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal. The High Court had no power to grant that permission. Time for any application was extended by 14 days from receipt of the expedited transcript.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused. The court stated that any renewed application for permission to appeal had to be made to the Court of Appeal under rule 52.15.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.