Lipinski, R (on the application of) v Wolverhampton Crown Court

The Administrative Court may have jurisdiction to review a Crown Court decision refusing bail, despite the exclusion in section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, but the jurisdiction should be exercised very sparingly. The court must first determine whether the decision concerns a matter relating to trial on indictment. If review is available, intervention is justified only where the Crown Court’s decision is perverse or unsupported by substantial material. The reviewing court must recognise that the trial judge heard and assessed the evidence directly. A conclusion that there are substantial grounds for believing that a defendant may interfere with jurors or the course of justice may be justified by circumstantial evidence and the defendant’s history, even where the judge cannot establish that the defendant was responsible for a particular act.

Two defendants in a large alleged carousel fraud sought judicial review of decisions by His Honour Judge Warner at Wolverhampton Crown Court refusing them bail. The refusal followed an alleged attempt to bribe a juror, the discharge of the jury, and the fixing of a new trial.

The claimants argued that the Administrative Court had jurisdiction to review the refusal of bail and that the evidence did not justify the Crown Court’s conclusions. The central issues were whether the decisions fell within the statutory exclusion for matters relating to trial on indictment and, if review was available, whether the Crown Court’s decisions were unlawful or perverse.

1. Jurisdiction. Section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 excludes judicial review of Crown Court decisions in matters relating to trial on indictment. The authorities provide helpful pointers, rather than a complete test. The relevant considerations include whether the order affects the conduct of a trial on indictment and whether the decision arises from the issue between the Crown and defendant formulated by the indictment.
2. The court expressed serious concern that a bail decision arising from alleged jury interference during an ongoing trial could fall within the exclusion. The wording may apply even though the original jury has been discharged and a new jury is to be empanelled. The court nevertheless proceeded on the assumption that jurisdiction existed.
3. Intensity of review. Applying the approach in the Isleworth Crown Court case, the question was whether the material before the Crown Court judge was inadequate to support his conclusions. The reviewing court was in a materially different position because the trial judge had heard the evidence and cross-examination.
4. In Mr Lipinski’s case, the security officer’s evidence that he had been closely followed by a man suspected of attempting to bribe a juror provided substantial material from which the Crown Court judge could infer a risk of jury interference. The decision was not perverse, and judicial review was refused.
5. In Mr Johnson’s case, the alleged attempt to interfere with the trial, his relationship with Mr Lipinski, his alleged role in the fraud, and earlier concerns about undisclosed bank accounts and a missing passport page supplied substantial material supporting a real danger that he might obstruct the course of justice. His previous compliance with bail conditions did not displace that conclusion. Judicial review was refused.
6. Permission was granted in both cases, but both applications were dismissed. The interested party was awarded costs of £875 against each claimant, subject to the stated restraint-order qualifications.

Not an appeal. The applications challenged decisions made by Wolverhampton Crown Court on 1 August 2005 refusing bail.