Anderson & Ors, R (on the application of) v City of York Council

Permission to bring judicial review does not entitle a claimant to an adjournment of the substantive hearing. The court must balance the desirability of determining an arguable public law challenge against the need for prompt resolution, particularly in planning cases, and the prejudice caused by delay.

Where funding difficulties have been known for a substantial period, proceedings to resolve them have been brought only shortly before the listed hearing, and there is limited reason to expect the funding body to change its position, an adjournment may properly be refused. The court may give substantial weight to financial and public-interest prejudice affecting the authority and developer.

The claimants, members of a support group for the Barbican Centre, sought judicial review of two planning decisions by the City of York Council concerning redevelopment of the Barbican. Permission had been granted, including in relation to the council’s decision not to require an environmental impact assessment.

Before the substantive hearing, the claimants applied for an adjournment of approximately six to eight weeks. Their solicitors said that the Legal Services Commission’s demand for a substantial contribution from interested persons prevented the case from proceeding and that proceedings against the Commission might resolve the funding dispute. The council and the interested developer opposed the application, relying on the delay, the late pursuit of the funding challenge and the resulting financial and public-interest prejudice.

The issue was whether the court should adjourn a permitted judicial review where the claimants’ legal representation depended on resolving an unresolved funding dispute.

1. The application for an adjournment was refused. The fact that permission to bring judicial review proceedings had been granted made it desirable in principle that the claim should proceed, but it did not determine the adjournment application.

2. The court’s discretion required a balance between the public interest in determining an arguable judicial review and the prejudice caused by further delay. Planning challenges should generally be pursued promptly. Some delay is inherent in judicial review, but an additional delay caused by a funding dispute shortly before the hearing required separate justification.

3. The dispute over contributions had been apparent since at least December 2004. Although the solicitors’ choice to pursue correspondence rather than immediate litigation was understandable, it meant that the requested delay arose from steps which could have been taken earlier. The correspondence also gave little reason for optimism that the Legal Services Commission would promptly alter its position.

4. The council and the developer faced real prejudice from further delay. The development was linked to more than £10 million of capital for the city’s swimming pools, while falling property values, rising construction costs and insurance costs for empty buildings created continuing financial risks. The public interest was engaged because those losses could affect the provision of public facilities.

5. Balancing those matters, it was appropriate to refuse the adjournment, despite the difficulty that refusal might cause the claimants and despite the arguable public importance of the proposed challenge.