Locke, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Certification of an Article 8 claim as clearly unfounded is lawful where, even assuming that family life is established, removal would plainly be proportionate and there is no realistic prospect of success before an immigration judge. A materially flawed aspect of the Secretary of State’s reasoning does not invalidate the certification if the proportionality conclusion remains unanswerable.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to maintain certification of his Article 8 claim as clearly unfounded. He had lived in the United Kingdom since childhood with relatives, including his mother and uncle, and relied on their alleged family life and emotional ties.

The Secretary of State disputed the existence of family life and concluded that removal would be proportionate. The central issue was whether the certification should be quashed and the claim referred to an immigration judge.

1. The application for judicial review was dismissed. The certification was not flawed.
2. The Secretary of State was entitled, on the evidence, to conclude that the claimant had not established family life for Article 8 purposes with his mother or uncle. The evidence of continuing dependency on the uncle was particularly scant, although an immigration judge might have reached different factual conclusions.
3. The Secretary of State’s reasoning that there was no evidence that the uncle could not return to Jamaica was flawed. Given that the uncle had settled immigration status and had lived in the United Kingdom for years, treating his possible departure as a realistic means of maintaining the relationship was Wednesbury unreasonable.
4. That flaw did not undermine the certification. Even assuming that family life existed with the mother, the uncle, or both, removal would be proportionate. There was no realistic prospect that an immigration judge could decide the proportionality issue in the claimant’s favour.
5. The grant of permission to bring proceedings did not materially assist the claimant. In R v SSHD ex parte Djakaija [2005] EWHC 1394, the relevance of permission had been considered, but permission in the present case had been granted without reasons and without all the information later placed before the court. It therefore carried little weight.
6. Quashing the certification would serve no useful purpose because the inevitable outcome of further proceedings, on the material before the court, would be an adverse decision on the merits. A detailed assessment of costs was ordered.