Huntingdon Life Sciences Group Plc & Anor v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty & Ors

A party cannot use an appeal against a later enforcement order to reopen an earlier order which was not appealed. Where an earlier injunction expressly permits enforcement against persons falling within a defined class, the enforcing court may act on the order’s terms. It need not investigate the position of anonymous or unidentified members of an unincorporated association where none has come forward to challenge the enforcement or claim that particular funds should be protected. A wide definition of persons subject to injunctive relief may be justified by the just and convenient jurisdiction under Supreme Court Act 1981, section 37, and may extend to enforcement of an associated costs order where the order so provides.

The claimants obtained injunctions restraining harassment and protest activity against their employees and premises. The court later made an order permitting enforcement against members of London Animal Action and defined “Protestors” to include persons acting in concert with the defendants who had notice of the order. A final third-party debt order was then made against London Animal Action’s bank account to enforce a costs order.

London Animal Action appealed, arguing that costs could be enforced only against named individual members and that the Master should have investigated whether anonymous members had sufficient knowledge of the order. The central issue was whether the appeal improperly sought to reopen the earlier order and whether the later enforcement order was lawful.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant’s principal argument was in substance an attack on the judge’s earlier order of 26 May 2004, rather than on the Master’s final third-party debt order of 1 March 2005. No appeal had been brought against the earlier order, and the court could not entertain an appeal against its own order.
2. The earlier order expressly permitted enforcement against members of London Animal Action and “Protestors” within the defined class. That class included persons acting in concert with the defendants who had notice of the order. The permission to enforce was not limited to the injunctive restraints and extended to the costs order made in the same order.
3. The broad definition was a permissible device in the exercise of the “just and convenient” jurisdiction under Supreme Court Act 1981, section 37. The unusual form of order reflected the anonymous and organised nature of the activities confronting the claimants.
4. The Master was entitled to proceed on the basis that the earlier order meant what it said. In the absence of representations from individual members, he was not required to investigate whether hidden or anonymous members knew of the order or whether some part of the funds should be protected.
5. The court noted conflicting approaches concerning whether an unincorporated association could be treated as a defendant. That conflict did not justify reopening the earlier order or setting aside the enforcement order. The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Queen's Bench Division): Mr Justice Mackay dismissed London Animal Action’s appeal from the final third-party debt order made by Master Yoxall on 1 March 2005.