Murley, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Transport

A person who attended and made representations at a statutory public inquiry may, subject to appropriately restricted grounds, be treated as a person aggrieved entitled to challenge the resulting decision. That status does not necessarily make the person a victim or potential victim for the purposes of section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The court will not determine abstract or hypothetical disputes where the challenged order does not affect any legal right or interest of the claimant. A possible statutory power affecting Crown or Duchy interests is immaterial where the relevant interest was not held and the power was not exercised. An unsuccessful claimant will ordinarily pay the defendant’s costs, although the court may summarily assess them.

The claimant challenged orders made under the Highways Act 1980 and the Acquisition of Land Act 1981 for improvements to the A30 in Cornwall. He relied on historic rights associated with the Duchy of Cornwall and alleged discrimination, although his tinning agreement had ended before the orders were made and there was no evidence that Duchy land was affected.

The issues were whether he was a person aggrieved, whether he was a victim or potential victim under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and whether the challenge raised a real dispute rather than an abstract question.

1. The claim was dismissed. The claimant’s tinning rights had ended before the orders were made. He had never owned the relevant land, lived about 20 miles away, and had no relevant interest affected by the orders.

2. Although the court considered that the claimant was, or could be assumed for present purposes to be, a person aggrieved, the court relied on Turner v Secretary of State for the Environment [1973] P&CR 123, at 139. A person who has attended and made representations at a public inquiry may have standing to establish that the decision is unlawful, provided the grounds are appropriately restricted.

3. That conclusion did not make the claimant a victim or potential victim under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The statutory concept of victim was treated, for present purposes, as requiring interests to be prejudicially affected. The claimant did not meet that requirement when the orders were made, and was not a potential victim of a proposed unlawful act.

4. The challenge was also hypothetical. Applying Ainsbury v Millington [1987] 1 WLR 379, the court does not pronounce on abstract questions of law where no dispute requires determination. The orders raised no issue concerning any right or interest of the claimant.

5. The alleged discrimination between the claimant and the Duchy could not be established through these orders. Any possible significance of section 327 of the Highways Act 1980 did not arise because the Duchy had not exercised any such right and the claimant had no relevant rights at the material time.

6. Costs followed the event. The claimant’s sincere belief in the claim and limited means did not justify departing from the usual rule. With the parties’ agreement, costs were summarily assessed at £3,000.