Davey, R (on the application of) v First Secretary of State & Anor

A challenge to a planning decision under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 288, is concerned with legal or procedural error. The court must not substitute its own view of the planning merits for that of the inspector.

The threshold for perversity or unreasonableness is high. It is insufficient that another inspector might have reached a different conclusion; the claimant must show that no reasonable inspector could have reached the decision. The existence of similar development nearby does not require permission, since its relevance remains a matter of planning judgment. An inspector may consider the longer-term public interest and need not be guided solely by the current neighbour’s lack of objection.

The claimant challenged an inspector’s dismissal of his appeal against refusal of planning permission for constructed front and rear extensions and a conservatory at his home. The local planning authority had refused permission on design and neighbour-amenity grounds. Because the works had already been constructed, the inspector treated the application as made under section 73A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

The claimant alleged perversity, inadequate reasoning and factual error. He later sought to raise allegations of bias and an inadequate site inspection. The central issue was whether the inspector had committed an error of law or procedure warranting intervention under section 288.

1. The application was refused. The inspector’s decision involved planning judgment and disclosed no error of law or procedure warranting quashing under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
2. The court could not substitute its assessment of the extensions’ design or their effect on neighbouring living conditions for the inspector’s assessment. The inspector was entitled to find that the bulky roof design harmed the character and appearance of the dwelling and area, and that the conservatory’s solid boundary wall was overbearing.
3. The perversity threshold was high. It was not enough that another inspector might have reached a different view. The claimant had to show that any reasonable inspector would have allowed the appeal. The inspector had essentially adopted and explained the local authority’s two reasons for refusal.
4. The inspector was entitled to take account of, but reject as insufficient, similar extensions and conservatories nearby. Whether neighbouring developments were in equally prominent locations, and whether they were otherwise relevant, were matters of planning judgment. Two wrongs did not necessarily make a right.
5. The inspector was entitled to consider the public interest and the possibility that the development would remain for many years, despite the present occupier of the adjoining property raising no objection. The reasoning was sufficiently clear because the claimant knew why permission had been refused.
6. The late attempt to introduce allegations of bias and inadequate inspection was refused. Such serious allegations should have been raised earlier, allowing the inspector an opportunity to respond. The second defendant was awarded costs, summarily assessed at £2,330 after a reduction of £400 for excessive document-review time.

The local planning authority refused permission on 16 April 2004. The first defendant’s inspector dismissed the claimant’s planning appeal on 16 February 2005. The Administrative Court refused the section 288 application and summarily assessed costs at £2,330.