Vella v London Borough of Lambeth & Anor

Inadequate sound insulation does not, without more, make premises a statutory nuisance under section 79(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The provision concerns a state of premises which is itself prejudicial to health, such as dampness, mould, dirt, noxious accumulations or vermin. It does not extend to premises which merely fail to prevent external activities from causing harmful noise.

The statutory language must be construed in its legislative and statutory context. The summary and potentially criminal consequences of the statutory nuisance regime also militate against extending it to impose large-scale upgrading obligations on landlords. Noise caused by activity in adjoining premises must be addressed, if at all, under the specific statutory provisions dealing with emitted noise or under other legislation.

The claimant sought judicial review of the London Borough of Lambeth’s decision not to serve an abatement notice on his landlord under section 80 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. He lived in a flat with inadequate sound insulation and experienced substantial noise from the flat above and communal areas, which medical evidence linked to his depressive illness.

The council accepted the scientific evidence but concluded that the premises were not a statutory nuisance. The claimant argued that the premises were in a state prejudicial to health under section 79(1)(a), relying principally on London Borough of Southwark v Ince. The central issue was whether inadequate insulation, permitting noise from adjoining premises to affect the claimant’s health, fell within that provision.

1. The claim was dismissed. The council’s refusal to serve an abatement notice was lawful and legally correct.
2. Section 79(1)(a) had to be construed in light of its legislative history and the reasoning in R v Bristol City Council, ex parte Everett and Birmingham City Council v Oakley. The provision addresses a state of premises which is itself prejudicial to health. It does not cover a condition which merely fails to prevent external activities from causing a health risk.
3. Inadequate sound insulation was not itself injurious or likely to cause injury to health. The prejudice resulted from activities undertaken by other tenants. The premises were not defective, unwholesome, filthy or verminous, and the case was materially different from cases involving mould growth and dampness.
4. The specific provisions dealing with noise emitted from premises and noise from vehicles supported the conclusion that noise was a distinct statutory problem. Other statutory schemes concerning sound insulation were also relevant to the proper construction of section 79(1)(a), though not necessarily conclusive.
5. The statutory nuisance machinery provided a summary remedy backed by enforcement powers and criminal sanctions. That context required caution before imposing an extended interpretation which could require immediate, large-scale expenditure to upgrade older housing stock. Such policy and housing-management decisions were matters for Parliament and elected authorities rather than judicial extension of the statutory language.
6. The court regarded the reasoning in London Borough of Southwark v Ince as undermined by Everett and Oakley. The claimant’s proposed interpretation would also produce the anomalous result that noise excluded from the specific noise provisions could nevertheless constitute a nuisance under section 79(1)(a).

First instance judicial review proceedings. No earlier decision in the same proceedings was stated.