Tidebrook Maritime Corporation v Vitol SA of Geneva MT "Front Commander"

Under a voyage charterparty, laytime cannot commence before the stipulated laydays unless the charterer gives the contractually required sanction or written consent. Communications authorising early notice of readiness, berthing or loading do not necessarily amount to consent to early commencement of laytime. Where an additional clause expressly regulates early loading, the court should apply that provision without implying a further term that laytime starts early. Commercial consequences cannot justify departing from clear contractual wording.

The owners claimed further demurrage under an Asbatankvoy charterparty. The vessel arrived, tendered notice of readiness, berthed and began loading before the first day of the laycan. The charterparty required written consent before laytime could commence early and contained separate provisions concerning early loading and the allocation of saved time.

The charterers’ emails authorised notice of readiness on arrival and early berthing and loading, but the parties disputed whether they also consented to early laytime. The court determined when laytime commenced and whether the emails or the commencement of loading constituted the required consent.

1. The claim for further demurrage failed on the issues determined. Laytime commenced at 06.00 on 9 January 2004, the earliest layday, under additional clause 31.

2. Clause 5 of the charterparty required the charterer’s sanction before laytime could commence before the stipulated date. Additional clause 31 made the requirement more explicit by requiring the charterer’s written consent before notice of readiness could be tendered and before laytime could commence before 06.00 on the earliest layday.

3. The emails did not amount to written consent. They confirmed that notice of readiness should be tendered on arrival and that the vessel should berth and commence loading early. They did not expressly or implicitly consent to early commencement of laytime.

4. Additional clause 33 expressly dealt with early loading before commencement of laytime. Consent to the early loading arrangements did not carry with it a separate consent to early laytime. The commencement of loading and the vessel’s berthing therefore did not satisfy clauses 5 and 31.

5. There was no basis for implying a term that laytime commenced early. The question was whether contractual consent had been given, and the additional clauses governed the issue. The cases cited by the charterers, including Nelson & Sons v Nelson Line Liverpool Ltd (No 3) [1908] 113 CC 235 (HL) and Pteroti Compania Naviera, SA v National Coal Board (Khios Breeze) [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 245, provided useful background but were not directly applicable.

6. The alternative submission concerning “time saved” did not justify starting laytime early. The amended clause 33 was interpreted as reducing the charterer’s credit to 50 per cent of the credit available under the unamended clause. This observation was not strictly necessary to determine the agreed issues.