Meyrick Estate Management Ltd & Ors v Secretary of State for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs

For National Park designation, National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, section 5(2), requires both natural beauty and opportunities for open-air recreation. Natural beauty means a high degree of relative naturalness, not merely visual attractiveness or landscape quality. Historical, cultural, architectural and similar features may assist in understanding how countryside evolved, but are not themselves relevant to deciding whether the natural beauty criterion is met. Section 114(2) expands the meaning of natural beauty for the purposes of conserving a designated Park; it does not expand the designation criterion. Future recreational possibilities may be considered, but the statutory question must not be diluted into whether there are potential opportunities or vague prospects of future change.

The claimants sought judicial review under paragraph 8 of Part III of Schedule 1 to the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949. They challenged confirmation of the New Forest National Park (Designation) Order 2002 insofar as it included Hinton Park.

The challenge concerned the Inspector’s approach to the statutory criteria in section 5(2): natural beauty and opportunities for open-air recreation. The claimants argued that the Inspector had relied on landscape attractiveness and historical or cultural considerations, and had applied a lowered test based on potential recreational opportunities. The central issue was whether the decision-maker had applied the statutory criteria lawfully.

1. Application granted; order quashed in part. The New Forest National Park (Designation) Order 2002 was quashed insofar as it affected the claimant’s land in contention at the Inquiry.
2. Natural beauty. The statutory criterion in section 5(2)(a) requires an extensive tract of countryside possessing a high degree of relative naturalness. It is distinct from visual attractiveness or general landscape quality. A well-maintained historic parkland, a Grade I listed building and well-ordered agricultural fields may be attractive, but they may also demonstrate that nature has been deliberately controlled. The Inspector had substituted visual attractiveness and landscape quality for the statutory requirement.
3. Section 114(2) of the 1949 Act, as amended, does not extend the meaning of natural beauty in section 5(2). It applies to the conservation and enhancement duties following designation. Wildlife and cultural heritage are relevant to those duties, but are not thereby made relevant to deciding whether land satisfies the designation criteria.
4. Open-air recreation. Future possibilities may be considered because the Act contains powers capable of creating access and recreational opportunities. However, the statutory question remains whether the area affords opportunities for open-air recreation. Treating the question as whether there are potential opportunities, potential scope, or a feasible prospect of future recreational use lowers the statutory threshold.
5. The Inspector materially relied on an erroneous finding that the Hinton Estate had a track record of granting access. The evidence showed no such track record. The error was central to the assessment under section 5(2)(b). A general assertion that circumstances may change cannot establish the criterion without a realistic assessment of the prospects of change. The absence of existing access, the estate’s stated wish not to provide access, and the absence of relevant rights under the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 were not properly addressed.
6. There is no necessary statutory distinction between the main body and outer boundary of a National Park when applying section 5(2)(b), although in practice there may be greater scope to exclude particular areas lacking the criterion when fixing the outer boundary.

First-instance judicial review. The judgment does not state any earlier appellate decision.