Aziz, R (on the application of) v General Medical Council

In disciplinary proceedings, delay may make continuation unfair and an abuse of process where it materially affects the fairness of the hearing or causes substantial prejudice. The court must balance the public interest in determining serious allegations against the practitioner’s interest in a fair and timely resolution. A regulator cannot justify delay merely by relying on a blanket policy; the circumstances must be assessed independently. Relevant considerations include the period after the complaint was made, the availability and reliability of evidence, prejudice to the practitioner, the seriousness of the allegations, and any continuing risk to the public. Where delay is exceptionally prolonged and continuation would be disproportionate, the court may quash the disciplinary decision without remittal.

The claimant, a doctor, challenged disciplinary proceedings brought by the General Medical Council concerning the omission of earlier employment from an application and curriculum vitae. A Fitness to Practise panel found serious professional misconduct and imposed a two-month suspension. The panel’s decision was procedurally defective because earlier applications had been determined by persons without jurisdiction, and the GMC accepted that the decision should be quashed.

The claimant argued that the proceedings should end because of unreasonable delay, prejudice, breach of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and abuse of process. He also challenged the underlying finding of an intention to deceive. The central issues were whether a reasonable panel could reach that finding and whether, in all the circumstances, further proceedings would be fair and proportionate.

1. The appeal was allowed. The Fitness to Practise panel’s decision was quashed, and the matter was not remitted. Permission to seek judicial review was refused as unnecessary.
2. The court could not conclude that no reasonable panel could find that the claimant had deliberately misled the Newcastle upon Tyne Trust with an intention to deceive. The underlying allegation therefore could not independently justify preventing any further consideration.
3. Delay had to be assessed principally from the making of the complaint to the GMC. The earlier lapse of time remained relevant because it increased the importance of dealing with the complaint promptly. The five-year limit for making a complaint was also a relevant contextual consideration.
4. Following Haikel v GMC (Appeal No 69 of 2001), the central question was whether the proceedings could still be fairly conducted. The court had to balance the availability and reliability of evidence, prejudice to the practitioner, the seriousness of the allegations, the public interest in determination, and the practitioner’s interest in knowing his position within a reasonable time. Staying proceedings for abuse of process was a rare and exceptional remedy, but the public interest was not automatically decisive.
5. The GMC’s decision to place the complaint on hold pending employment litigation was erroneous because it was made under a general practice without considering whether delay was justified in the particular circumstances. The panel repeated that error by treating the policy as reasonable rather than assessing the matter independently. It also failed to consider the claimant’s employment prejudice and the difficulty of obtaining evidence concerning the legal advice on which he relied.
6. By the time of the judgment, the proceedings had lasted approximately five years from the complaint and nearly ten years from the underlying events. The allegation concerned a one-off lapse, with no suggestion of professional incompetence or future risk to patients. In those circumstances, further proceedings would be wholly unfair, disproportionate and abusive.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal from the Fitness to Practise panel’s decision was allowed. The decision was quashed without remittal.
• Earlier High Court application: Stanley Burnton J had refused permission to challenge the referral decision, holding that the delay and fairness issues could be raised before the Fitness to Practise panel.