Thakerar v Lynch Hall & Hornby

An extended civil restraint order may be made where a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit. The court’s jurisdiction arises from its inherent power to prevent abuse of its processes and is now reflected in Practice Direction C accompanying Part 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. It is not necessary that every previous application should have been totally without merit. Repeated appeals, renewed applications for refused relief, and numerous hopeless applications may justify an order. The order does not bar further applications absolutely. It requires the party to obtain permission first, which should be granted where the proposed application has merit.

The defendants applied for an extended civil restraint order against Ms Thakerar. The application had previously been adjourned and was renewed with notice after the court listed it for consideration alongside Ms Thakerar’s applications. The defendants relied on a chronology showing repeated appeals and applications, including challenges to a statutory demand, repeated requests for the same relief, applications for adjournments and applications for permission to appeal. The central issue was whether her conduct justified an extended civil restraint order and, in particular, whether the relevant applications had all been without merit.

1. Application granted. The court was satisfied that Ms Thakerar had notice that the defendants’ application would be renewed. The application had already been considered by Mr Justice Rimer.
2. The court possessed an inherent jurisdiction to make orders preventing abuse of its processes. The leading authority was Bhamjee v Forsdick [2004] 1 WLR 88, in which the Court of Appeal described a civil restraint order as appropriate for obsessive resort to litigation and disregard of the need for reasonable grounds.
3. Practice Direction C accompanying Part 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 formalised the jurisdiction. Its reference to a party who had persistently issued claims or made applications which were totally without merit did not reproduce the word all used in Bhamjee v Forsdick. Accordingly, it was not a pre-condition that every application had been totally without merit, although that circumstance remained relevant to the exercise of discretion.
4. Ms Thakerar’s conduct justified the order. She routinely appealed adverse decisions, repeatedly sought relief which had already been refused, and made numerous applications and applications for adjournments, the vast majority of which were hopeless. Her limited successes did not outweigh the overall pattern, particularly as the dispute concerned a liability of £1,000.
5. An extended civil restraint order was therefore made in the form of the order previously used in Bhamjee v Forsdick. It lasted for two years from 21 October 2005. Ms Thakerar remained able to make applications, but was required to obtain the court’s permission first. Permission would be granted for an application with merit. Costs were assessed summarily at £3,500.