Owalabi v Court Number 4 At the High Court of Justice In Spain

Extradition may be barred by delay only where returning the person would be unjust or oppressive. Unjustness principally concerns prejudice to the conduct of the trial. Oppressiveness principally concerns hardship caused by changes in the person's circumstances, although the concepts overlap and together address overall fairness. Where a person relies on a changed lifestyle, the court may assess all surrounding circumstances, including continued offending and convictions, as well as marriage or family circumstances. An appeal against an extradition order succeeds only where the statutory conditions for allowing the appeal are satisfied.

A District Judge ordered the claimant's extradition to Spain under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003. The claimant appealed under section 26, arguing that the passage of time barred extradition under sections 11(1)(c) and 14.

The delay followed his arrest in Spain in February 2000, subsequent investigative and jurisdictional steps, identification of his true identity in October 2003, and issue of a European arrest warrant in July 2004. He relied on the delay, his remarriage and family circumstances, and alleged failures by United Kingdom authorities to discover the Spanish proceedings.

1. The appeal was dismissed. Under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003, the High Court could allow the appeal only if the District Judge ought to have decided a question differently and would then have been required to discharge the claimant, or if new issues or evidence would have produced that result.

2. Sections 11(1)(c) and 14 required the court to decide whether extradition was barred because, by reason of the passage of time, it would be unjust or oppressive. The test stated by Lord Diplock in Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 was applicable. Unjustness primarily concerns prejudice to the trial. Oppressiveness primarily concerns hardship resulting from changed circumstances. The concepts overlap and together cover cases where return would be unfair.

3. The delay was at most five and a half years, materially less than in the authorities relied on by the claimant. The District Judge was entitled to consider the claimant's remarriage together with his continuing criminal conduct and convictions. Those circumstances did not establish that extradition would be unjust or oppressive.

4. The District Judge had considered the relevant facts and circumstances and had given adequate reasons. His decision was plainly correct. The claimant was to be extradited within the statutory period under section 36, and legal aid assessment was granted.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the District Judge's extradition order was dismissed.
• District Judge: On 28 September 2005, the claimant was ordered to be extradited to Spain pursuant to section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.