Fullard & Anor, R (on the application of) v Woking Magistrates' Court

An implied licence permitting police officers to enter or remain on private premises may be revoked. Whether words amount to revocation is an objective question, assessed in context. The magistrates’ factual assessment ordinarily stands unless no reasonable tribunal could have reached it.

Revocation does not make the officer a trespasser immediately. The officer must have a reasonable opportunity to leave. An assault committed before that opportunity has expired may therefore be an assault on an officer acting in the execution of duty. After an officer is assaulted and properly arrested, fellow officers may enter or remain to assist, prevent crime and protect the officer.

The claim arose from a case stated by Woking Magistrates’ Court after Wayne Fullard was convicted of assaulting a police constable contrary to section 89(1) of the Police Act 1996. Ryan Roalfe was convicted of assaulting two further constables.

The officers had attended private premises to investigate a damage-only road traffic accident. The magistrates found that an implied permission to remain was initially present, that it was clearly revoked at the doorway, and that the first assault occurred immediately, before the officer had a reasonable opportunity to leave. They also found that the later officers were acting in the execution of their duty.

The central questions were whether the words revoked the implied licence, whether sufficient time to leave had been allowed, and whether the officers thereafter continued to act in accordance with their duty.

1. Case stated appeal dismissed. The convictions were ones which the magistrates were entitled to make.
2. The officers’ initial presence on the driveway depended on an implied permission recognised in Robson v Hallett [1967] 2 QB 939. Such permission could be withdrawn.
3. Whether words revoked the permission was an objective question. The court had to assess whether, viewed in context, the words amounted to a request to leave. The meaning of expressions such as “fuck off” was principally a matter for the magistrates who heard the evidence. The High Court should not substitute its own impression unless the conclusion was outside the range reasonably open to them. The approach in Lambert v Roberts [1981] 72 Cr App R 223, Gilham v Breidenbach [1982] RTR 328 and Snook v Mannion [1982] RTR 321 supported that analysis.
4. Once permission was revoked, the officer had to be allowed a reasonable opportunity to leave. That principle was established in Robson v Hallett and also appeared in Davis v Lisle [1936] 2 KB 434. The magistrates were entitled to find that the blow was struck virtually immediately, before such an opportunity had arisen.
5. After the assault on PC Griffiths, and his arrest of Mr Fullard, the other officers were entitled to assist him and, if necessary, discourage Mr Roalfe from interfering. They were therefore acting in the execution of their duty. Section 17(1)(h) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 did not cogently apply, but section 17(6) might have supplied the correct analysis. Independently, the general power and duty to prevent crime and defend a person under attack sufficed.

• Woking Magistrates’ Court: convicted Mr Fullard of assaulting PC Griffiths and Mr Roalfe of assaulting PCs Jordan and Smith. The magistrates stated a case concerning whether the officers were acting in the execution of their duty.
• High Court (Administrative Court): answered the stated question affirmatively and dismissed the appeal by case stated.