Okandeji v Bow Street Magistrates Court & Ors

Under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, where the High Court remits a question to a District Judge and the judge reaches the same decision, section 104(7) deems the appeal to have been dismissed by decision of the High Court. The resulting decision is not open to further appeal or judicial review in the High Court. Section 104(7) is not an ouster of jurisdiction: it forms part of a statutory scheme that provides access to the courts while restricting successive appeals after reconsideration. The statutory language is clear, and the court need not apply a special restrictive approach to its construction. A suitable point of law of general public importance may nevertheless be certified for possible appeal to the House of Lords, without leave being granted.

The claimant was the subject of an Australian extradition request under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003. The District Judge sent the case to the Secretary of State, who ordered extradition. On an earlier appeal, the Divisional Court remitted specified questions to the District Judge under section 104(1)(b), directing reconsideration after further evidence on Australian law.

The District Judge reached the same decision on remittal. The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that section 104(7) did not prevent review of the second decision. Alternatively, he sought certification of points concerning the Article 6 issue and the jurisdiction of the High Court. The central issue was whether section 104(7), read with section 116, made the second decision a decision of the High Court which could not be further challenged in that court.

1. Application dismissed in substance. The District Judge’s second decision was deemed by section 104(7) of the Extradition Act 2003 to be a decision of the High Court. It was therefore not amenable to further judicial review or appeal in the High Court, subject only to the statutory route to the House of Lords where the certification and leave requirements were met.
2. Section 104(7) was not an ouster provision. Part 2 expressly provides access to the courts through the District Judge and an appeal to the High Court. Section 104(7) instead restricts the number of appeals where the High Court has remitted a question and the District Judge reaches the same conclusion. The principle stated in Pyx Granite Company Ltd v Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1960] AC 260 therefore did not require a different construction.
3. The language of section 104(7) was clear and unambiguous. Its alternative procedural interpretation was inconsistent with section 104(6), under which a different decision on remittal results in discharge without any need for the High Court to deem the appeal allowed. The statutory purpose was to provide fair procedures while avoiding successive and repeated applications that could prolong extradition proceedings.
4. There was no inconsistency between section 87(3) and section 104(7). Once the case had already been sent to the Secretary of State and extradition ordered, the Secretary of State’s limited functions did not include reconsideration of general Convention-rights issues after the remitted decision.
5. The court certified three points of law of general public importance, including the jurisdictional question, but declined to grant leave to appeal, leaving that question to the House of Lords.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): On an earlier appeal, the Divisional Court remitted questions to the District Judge under section 104(1)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003. The District Judge then reached the same decision, which section 104(7) deemed to be a decision of the High Court.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): The present court held that the deemed decision was not amenable to further appeal or judicial review in the High Court. It certified three points of law of general public importance but refused leave to appeal.