K (Arranged marriage)

When assessing K (Arranged marriage) threshold under the Children Act 1989, the court must apply the objective standard of reasonable parenting while remaining sensitive to the family’s cultural, social and religious context. An arranged marriage must be distinguished from a forced marriage: the former is not inherently condemnable, whereas the latter is an abuse requiring robust protective intervention. The wardship or inherent jurisdiction should ordinarily be used only where necessary to protect a child from parental default or abuse. Intervention requires a real possibility of harm and must be proportionate. The court should weigh the risks of making protective orders against the risks of making none, including foreseeable counterproductive consequences.

These were care proceedings concerning K, aged 16, who had been brought to England with her Kurdish Muslim family after her father obtained asylum. Her parents had arranged a religious marriage between K and an adult man when she was 15. K alleged rape and abuse, and feared being taken to Iraq or entering another marriage. The local authority accepted that a care order was disproportionate but sought a supervision order and protective orders preventing marriage or foreign travel until K’s eighteenth birthday. The central issues were whether public-law supervision was necessary and whether the court’s protective jurisdiction should be invoked to control K’s marriage or travel.

1. Threshold and cultural context. The court accepted that threshold under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 was established, but made no finding that K had been physically abused by her father and found that the local authority had not established a forced marriage. The marriage was arranged, not shown to have been against K’s wishes, and had taken place in circumstances acceptable within the family’s beliefs and cultural mores. Assessment of parenting by an objective standard must nevertheless take account of cultural, social and religious realities.
2. Supervision order. No supervision order was made. K was almost 17, had lived at home for several months without a public-law order, and neither she nor her parents were willing to cooperate with compulsory intervention. The order was unlikely to improve cooperation and might be counterproductive. Since a care order and secure accommodation were already accepted to be inappropriate, proportionality also told against supervision.
3. Protective jurisdiction. Forced marriage is intolerable and justifies the use of the court’s protective powers, including wardship and the inherent jurisdiction. Arranged marriage is different and must be respected. In modern conditions, intervention to control a minor’s marriage is ordinarily justified only where necessary to protect the child from parental default or abuse. A real possibility of harm may suffice, particularly where preventive action is required, but the court must guard against stereotyping and inappropriate interference with families because of cultural or religious difference.
4. Application and outcome. The principal risk was that K herself might seek a further marriage, rather than that her parents would arrange one improperly. The court concluded that the parents posed no significant risk, while a marriage prohibition might drive K and her family to avoid the court altogether and produce serious unintended consequences. Similar considerations made travel restrictions unnecessary and disproportionate. No supervision order, wardship order or protective order restricting marriage or travel was made.