Attorney General v Leicester & Anor

Under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, a proceedings order may be made where a person has habitually and persistently, without reasonable ground, brought vexatious civil proceedings, made vexatious applications, or instituted vexatious prosecutions. Vexatiousness is shown by litigation having little or no legal basis, imposing disproportionate inconvenience, harassment and expense, and abusing court process. Persistent litigation is also characterised by repeatedly advancing substantially the same complaints, challenging adverse decisions automatically, ignoring court orders and continuing after the rational point at which the litigation should stop. Where the conduct extends into both civil and criminal proceedings, an all proceedings order may be appropriate.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for orders restricting the litigious activities of Royston Leicester and Margrit Leicester. The first application sought a civil proceedings order. The later application sought an all proceedings order after the defendants began pursuing private prosecutions as well as civil proceedings.

The defendants were properly served and had an opportunity to be heard, but neither attended and neither filed evidence or written submissions. The court reviewed extensive unsuccessful litigation involving the defendants’ businesses, bankruptcy proceedings, liquidation proceedings, claims against lawyers, judges and public officials, and private prosecutions. The central issue was whether the statutory conditions for restrictive orders were satisfied and, if so, what form of order was appropriate.

1. The court was satisfied that the defendants had been effectively served and had been given an opportunity to be heard. Their absence did not prevent the applications from being determined.
2. The defendants’ litigation had been uniformly unsuccessful and misconceived. It had resulted in strike-outs, stays, refusals of permission to appeal, Grepe v Loam orders and civil restraint orders. As successive avenues were closed, the defendants opened others, including the criminal jurisdiction.
3. Adopting the guidance of Lord Bingham of Cornhill LCJ in Barker (16 February 2000) (unreported), the court treated a proceeding as vexatious where it had little or no discernible legal basis, imposed inconvenience, harassment and expense out of proportion to any likely gain, and abused the court process. Persistent and habitual litigation included repeating substantially the same causes of action, suing successive parties who should have been joined, automatically challenging adverse decisions and disregarding court orders.
4. Those features applied to both defendants. The Attorney General’s case was made out overwhelmingly. Although such orders were serious, they were necessary to stop the continuing abuse.
5. Because the defendants had resorted to both civil and criminal proceedings, the appropriate order in each case was an all proceedings order under section 42. The earlier application for a civil proceedings order was withdrawn. Copies of the judgment were directed to be provided to the defendants at public expense.