Beatrice Ero, R (on the application of) v Croydon Crown Court

Before extending custody time limits, the Crown Court must be satisfied that the prosecution acted with due diligence and that there is a good and sufficient reason for the whole period of extension sought. The required duration is a material consideration; a court should not approve a longer extension merely because a shorter extension is needed. The convenience or unavailability of counsel is not, by itself, a sufficient reason. An application challenging an extension must be brought promptly, ordinarily within days and often within seven days. Delay may cause prejudice because an unlawful order might otherwise have been set aside and reconsidered within the custody time limit. Relief may therefore be refused in the court’s discretion even if the original inquiry was inadequate.

The claimant sought judicial review of an order made by Croydon Crown Court on 12 August 2005. The order extended custody time limits from 15 November 2005 to 7 January 2006, immediately after the fixed trial date. The claimant was facing charges arising from alleged breaches of immigration law and had remained in custody since May 2005.

The claimant argued that the Crown Court had not properly considered whether the prosecution had acted with due diligence or whether there was good and sufficient cause for the full extension. The Administrative Court also had to determine whether the claim had been brought promptly and, if not, whether relief should nevertheless be granted.

1. The application was dismissed. The court assumed, without deciding, that the inquiry by the Crown Court judge into the statutory preconditions for extending custody time limits had been inadequate.
2. The Crown Court must be satisfied both that the prosecution acted with due diligence and that there is a good and sufficient reason for extending custody beyond the ordinary expiry date. The court must consider the entire period sought. A short extension cannot justify granting a longer extension without a good and sufficient reason for the whole period.
3. Where the defence does not allege a lack of due diligence, the court may more readily become satisfied that due diligence has been established. Due diligence does not require the prosecution to act as expeditiously as possible at every stage. Delay does not defeat an extension if it was immaterial in the context of the proceedings and did not cause the need for the extension.
4. The unavailability or convenience of counsel is not necessarily, and ordinarily is not by itself, a good reason for extending custody time limits. Other matters referred to at the hearing might nevertheless have affected the trial date, but their effect was speculative on the evidence.
5. The judicial review claim had not been brought promptly. It was issued nearly three months after the Crown Court order, although such challenges should generally be brought within seven or fourteen days, and certainly within days of the transfer of representation. A change of solicitors did not itself excuse the delay.
6. The delay was material. Had the claim been brought promptly, an unlawful order could have been set aside and the issue remitted to the Crown Court while the custody time limit remained relevant. The court therefore exercised its discretion to refuse relief.

The judgment records that Croydon Crown Court made the challenged custody time-limit order on 12 August 2005. The Administrative Court dismissed the subsequent judicial review claim.