JP Morgan Chase Bank & Ors v Springwell Navigation Corporation

Similar fact evidence in civil proceedings must first be logically probative of an issue, assessed in a fact-sensitive manner. If admissible, the court retains a discretion to exclude it where its limited probative value is outweighed by the cost, delay, complexity or prejudice caused by admitting it. Evidence that other customers received investment advice does not, without a close factual correlation or evidence of a system, establish that the defendant had an advisory relationship with the claimant. The nature of a commercial relationship must primarily be determined from the parties’ contractual documents and what they said and did to each other.

Chase applied under CPR 3.4 and the inherent jurisdiction to strike out paragraphs 190–193 of Springwell’s Amended Defence and Counterclaim. Those paragraphs relied on the experiences of other Greek shipping families who had dealt with Chase. Springwell contended that the evidence showed a common advisory relationship and a system of recommending Russian investments, and was relevant to whether Chase had advised Springwell and caused its losses.

The application was confined to paragraphs 190–193. The issue was whether the proposed evidence was admissible similar fact evidence and, if so, whether it should nevertheless be excluded in the interests of proportionate case management.

1. Application granted. Paragraphs 190–193 of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim were struck out. No evidence relating to the other Greek families was to be called in support of those paragraphs, or otherwise, without leave of the court.
2. Following O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2003] EWCA Civ 1058, the court applied a two-stage approach. First, the evidence had to be logically probative of an issue, with admissibility assessed by reference to the particular facts. Secondly, even admissible evidence could be excluded in the court’s discretion, having regard to the overriding objective, probative force, cost, delay and procedural complexity.
3. The evidence of other families could not assist on causation. Their circumstances, investment objectives, risk criteria, contractual relationships and dealings with Chase might differ materially from Springwell’s. Nor could the general tenor of recommendations made to other customers establish what advice was given to Springwell.
4. The fact that Chase may have acted as an adviser to other members of the Hellenic group did not logically establish an advisory relationship with Springwell. That relationship had to be determined from the relevant contractual documents and from what Chase and Springwell themselves said and did. A Chase document showing that an advisory role applied to all members of the group could, however, be relevant and disclosable because it would concern Springwell directly.
5. Even if the evidence possessed some theoretical probative value, it was extremely slight. Its admission would require a satellite inquiry into the other families’ contracts, portfolios, investments and communications, causing substantial additional cost, delay and complexity. Those consequences outweighed its limited utility.

Not stated in the judgment.