Wood v Government of Germany & Anor

Under section 11(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 1989, the applicant must show that, by reason of the passage of time, returning him would be unjust or oppressive. The passage of time must have a causal connection with the hardship or injustice relied upon. “Unjust” concerns whether justice can be obtained in the requesting state. “Oppressive” concerns hardship arising from changes in the applicant’s circumstances during the relevant period. If the statutory test is satisfied, discharge is mandatory rather than discretionary.

The claimant, a dual British and German national, faced extradition to Germany for allegations of unlawful killing and grievous bodily harm. He had previously been acquitted in Germany, but that acquittal was quashed on appeal and a retrial was ordered. After commitment at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, he applied for habeas corpus, relying solely on section 11(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 1989.

He relied on his age, threats, settled life in England, family circumstances, and depressive symptoms. The central issue was whether, by reason of the passage of time, his return would be unjust or oppressive.

1. Application dismissed. The claimant’s evidence of hardship was accepted, but it did not satisfy section 11(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 1989.
2. The relevant period ran from the alleged offences to the present. The burden was on the claimant to establish that, in all the circumstances, returning him would be unjust or oppressive because of the delay. If that condition were met, discharge would be mandatory and would not involve judicial discretion (para [10]).
3. Following Kakis v The Government of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 and Union of India v Narang [1978] AC 247, “unjust” and “oppressive” have distinct meanings. “Unjust” concerns the possibility of obtaining justice in the requesting state. “Oppressive” concerns hardship caused by changes in the applicant’s circumstances during the relevant period (para [11]).
4. The statutory defence required a causal link between the passage of time and the circumstances said to make return unjust or oppressive. That link was absent. The claimant’s youth, threats, domestic circumstances, settled life, and mental health difficulties did not result from the passage of time in the manner required by the statute (paras [12]–[15]).
5. The fact that the claimant had previously been acquitted did not alter the conclusion, since German law provided for the prosecution appeal and retrial. The application therefore failed (paras [14]–[15]).